



APPLICATION SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT SECURITY TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

This Application Security and Development Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) provides security guidance for use throughout the application development lifecycle. This STIG provides the guidance needed to promote the development, integration, and updating of secure applications. Subjects covered in this document are: development, design, testing, conversions and upgrades for existing applications, maintenance, software configuration management, education, and training. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) encourages sites to use these guidelines as early as possible in the application development process. Some vulnerabilities may require significant application changes to correct. The earlier the STIG requirements are integrated into the development lifecycle, the less disruptive the remediation process will be.

1.2 Authority

DoD Directive 8500.01E requires that “all IA and IA-enabled IT products incorporated into DoD information systems shall be configured in accordance with DoD-approved security configuration guidelines” and tasks DISA to “develop and provide security configuration guidance for IA and IA-enabled IT products in coordination with Director, NSA”. This document is provided under the authority of DoD Directive 8500.01E.

The use of the principles and guidelines in this STIG will provide an environment that meets or exceeds the security requirements of DoD systems operating at the Mission Assurance Category (MAC) II Sensitive level.

The Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) for the DoD recommends actions during periods when a heightened defensive posture is required to protect DoD computer networks from attack. The Information Assurance Officer (IAO) will ensure compliance with the security requirements of the current INFOCON level and will modify security requirements to comply with this guidance.

It should be noted that Field Security Operations (FSO) support for the STIGs, Checklists, and Tools is only available to DoD Customers.

1.3 Scope

This document is a requirement for all DoD developed, architected, and administered applications and systems connected to DoD networks. These requirements assist Application Development Program Managers, Application Designers, Release Managers, Security Managers (SMs), Information Assurance Managers (IAMs), Information Assurance Officers (IAOs), and System Administrators (SAs) with configuring and maintaining security controls for applications. The requirements listed can be used to evaluate custom developed applications and Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) software packages as well. Some requirements are not applicable to COTS software packages.

1.4 Writing Conventions

Throughout this document, statements are written using words such as “**will**” and “**should**”. The following paragraphs are intended to clarify how these STIG statements are to be interpreted.

A reference that uses “**will**” indicates mandatory compliance. All requirements of this kind will also be documented in the italicized policy statements in bullet format, which follow the topic paragraph. This makes all “**will**” statements easier to locate and interpret from the context of the topic. The IAO will adhere to the instructions as written.

For each italicized policy bullet, the text will be preceded by parentheses containing the STIG Identifier (STIGID), which corresponds to an item on the checklist and the severity code of the bulleted item. An example of this will be as follows: "(G111: CAT I)". Throughout the document accountability is directed to the IAO to “ensure” a task is carried out or monitored. These tasks may be carried out by the IAO or delegated to someone else as a responsibility or duty.

A reference to “**should**” indicates a recommendation that further enhances the security posture of the site. These recommended actions will be documented in the text paragraphs but not in the italicized policy bullets. All reasonable attempts to meet this criterion will be made.

1.5 Vulnerability Severity Code Definitions

Category I (CAT I)	<p>Vulnerabilities leading to the immediate unauthorized access of the application.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invalid/Expired PKI certificates allowed for authentication • Invalid DoD PKI certificates are not used • Data/Password transmitted in unencrypted format • Passwords stored in unapproved encrypted format • Default passwords are not changed • Login Passwords are displayed as clear text • Application contains embedded authentication data • Users accounts are not locked after unsuccessful logon attempts • Authentication credentials are resident after a session terminates • Access Control mechanism rely on only a resource name • Hidden fields are used to control user access privileges • Secure failure design principle not followed • Invalid User input validation allowing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SQL Injection Integer overflows Format string vulnerabilities Command Injection Cross Site Scripting Buffer overflows
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<p>Category II (CAT II)</p>	<p>Vulnerabilities having a high potential of granting unauthorized access of the application.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentation not established or followed <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SSP/SSAA Application Configuration Guide Security classification guide MAC and CONF levels guide Coding standards Design Document Threat models and mitigations • Processes not established or followed <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security incident response Vulnerability management Security training Application Maintenance Physical handling and storage of information Software change control Testing DAA approval for all open source, public domain software COTS products don't comply with NSA Protection Profiles. DoD Ports and Protocols • Updates and patches are not available • Development build and test systems are not compliant with DoD security policies • Configuration files are stored in the same directory as user data • Interface services are not separated from data storage services • Invalid Uniform Resource Locator (URL) are used • Detection and prevention of session hijacking is not supported • Temporary storage is not removed when session is terminated • Improper error handling • Data is not properly encrypted in storage or transit • Improper permissions to encryption keys and authentication data • Administrative credentials are used to connect to a database • Access to data is not revoked prior to instantiation or release • Integrity mechanisms are not supported for transmitted information • Sensitive/Classified not properly marked • Application not PK-enabled or uses unapproved certificates • Unapproved passwords or password mechanisms are used • Application sessions not properly implemented • Access to data is not role based • The separation of duties and "least privilege" are not enforced • Insufficient data validation • Susceptible to race conditions • Insufficient auditing or auditing permissions
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improper use of mobile code • Inadequate change control • Critical application is hosted on a general purpose machine • Unnecessary functionality is enabled by default • Protections against denial of service attacks are not implemented • Production database exports exist with sensitive data • Backups and contingency planning not performed • User account management not performed • Demilitarized zone (DMZ) not setup
Category III (CAT III)	<p>Vulnerabilities indirectly causing the application to have unauthorized access.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Budget for IA is not established • COTS products are not NIAP approved • Inadequate Transaction Rollback and journaling • Global variables are used when local variables could be used • No notification given when audit logs are nearing capacity • No display of user's last login information • SCM Plan not established or followed • No Tester Assigned to Security Flaws • Code coverage statistics are not maintained • No Decommissioning Procedures • No Notifications of Low System Resources • Audit trails not reviewed or automatically monitored • Inactive user accounts are not disabled

Table 1-1. Vulnerability Severity Code Definitions

1.6 STIG Distribution

Parties within the DoD and Federal Government's computing environments can obtain the applicable STIG from the DoD IA Portal STIG page or Information Assurance Support Environment (IASE) website. These sites contain the latest copies of any STIG, as well as checklists, scripts, and other related security information. The URL for the DoD IA Portal STIG page is <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/397960> and the URL for the IASE site is <http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/index.html>.

1.7 Document Revisions

Comments or proposed revisions to this document should be sent via e-mail to fso_spt@disa.mil. DISA FSO will coordinate all change requests with the relevant DoD organizations before inclusion in this document.

1.8 Document Overview

This guide is intended to assist in the design, development, testing, deployment, and maintenance of secure applications. As operating system security postures continue to improve, attackers are turning their attention toward application vulnerabilities, increasing the need for secure application development practices.

This guide may be used for both in-house application development and to assist in the evaluation of the security of third-party applications. The guidance provided is not specific to any one platform, programming language, or application type. Some sections of this guide may not apply to all applications. In some cases, specific guidance has been provided based upon platform, programming language, or language types. The presence of specific guidance for a technology does not exempt applications utilizing other technologies from a requirement.

When using this guide to evaluate third-party products, some sections may not be applicable. Answers to some questions will need to be gathered through discussions with vendor representatives or from public information about the company.

For the best results, the recommendations provided in this guide should be implemented as early in the development process as possible. When developing applications for the DoD, third-party developers should be encouraged to integrate these procedures into their lifecycle. DoD STIGS are available for existing third party products such as databases, web servers, web application servers, and desktop applications. Third-party product STIGs used in conjunction with Operating System and Network STIG, provide a basis for a secure development baseline. DoD STIGS can be found at the DoD IA Portal website: <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/397960> or on the IASE website: <http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/index.html>.

1.9 Document Organization

This document divides security requirements by roles found in the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC).

Section 2 is devoted to Program Management requirements. These requirements focus on the Program Manager in charge of the software development team.

Section 3 focuses on design and development requirements geared toward the development team. The development team is responsible for the secure design of the application.

Section 4 concentrates on Software Configuration Management and the requirements needed for the Software Release Manager. The software Release Manager is responsible for the builds and baselines of the deployed system.

Section 5 deals with testing requirements for the Test Manager. The Test Manager is responsible for the security testing of the application. The Test Manager will create and use Test Plans and procedures to perform required security testing.

Section 6 deals with deployment requirements for the IAO. The IAO may not perform the daily security analysis that may be required, but instead assign a System Administrator (SA) or other individual to perform these duties. Ultimately, the IAO is responsible for the security of the deployed application.

2. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

This section describes the IA related activities required of the Program Manager as the application progresses through the SDLC.

The Program Manager should follow the security guidance from the Defense Acquisition Guidebook.

https://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=GuideBook\IG_c4.4.4.asp

Below is a summary of the best practices for program management of software systems:

- Select individuals with domain experience in developing comparable software systems; with successful past performance; and with a mature SDLC
- Acquire the documentation for target production, test, and development platforms
- Plan for support and deployment of the software into a production environment
- Plan for emerging and evolving technologies
- Use COTS, Government off-the-shelf (GOTS) products, and reusable components before developing new software
- Acquire COTS and GOTS products and support services prior to design phase
- Track COTS software purchases and maintenance licenses
- Acquire SDLC tools, such as development environments, configuration management tools, requirements analysis tools, testing tools, and source code analyzers
- Use open system concepts and a modular design
- Selecting the programming language based on system performance, life-cycle costs, risks, and interoperability
- Use DoD standard data and following data administrative policies in DoD Directive 8320.2
- Assessing information operations risks (see DoD Directive S-3600.1) using techniques such as independent expert reviews

In addition, the program manager should apply the following security considerations to software design and management (see [DoD Directive 5000.1](#)):

- Create a document impact analysis statement addressing software reliability and accompanies modifications to existing DoD software
- Establish a formal software change control process
- The change control process should indicate whether foreign nationals, in any way, participated in software development, modification, or remediation
- Select software quality assurance personnel to monitor the software change process
- Use an independent verification and validation team
- Analyze the technical risks and vulnerabilities as well as creation of a threat model
- Verify each foreign national employed by contractors/subcontractors to develop, modify, or remediate software code specifically for DoD use has a security clearance commensurate with the level of the program in which the software is being used

- Verify primary vendors on DoD contracts having subcontractors who employ cleared foreign nationals work only in a certified or accredited environment (DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP))
- Verify DoD software with coding done in foreign environments or by foreign nationals is reviewed for malicious code by software quality assurance personnel
- When employing COTS software, preference is given during product selection and evaluation to those vendors who can demonstrate that they took efforts to minimize the security risks associated with foreign nationals who developed, modified, or remediated the COTS software being offered
- Software quality assurance personnel review software sent to locations not directly controlled by the DoD or its contractors for malicious code when it is returned to the DoD contractor's facilities

2.1 Documentation

The Program Manager has oversight responsibility for creating the System Security Plan, Application Configuration Guide, Classification Guide, and overall budget specifically including the IA section and Coding Standards, if applicable. The Program Manager is responsible for the communication of all system documentation to the application deployment personnel. The Program Manager should designate a lead developer to handle security and security related issues.

2.1.1 System Security Plan (SSP)/System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA)

The Program Manager is required to produce a System Security Plan (SSP) or System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA). These documents provide an overview of the security requirements of the application.

The SSP/SSAA will include the following:

1. Technical, administration, and procedural IA program policies
2. Designation of IA personnel
3. Identification of the IA requirements
4. IA objectives (e.g., requirements for data handling or dissemination, system redundancy and backup, or emergency response).

The Program Manager will document the following:

1. Appointments to required IA roles (e.g., Designated Approving Authority (DAA) and IAM/IAO)
 2. Assigned duties
 3. Appointment Criteria (training, security clearance, and IT-designation).
- *(APP2010.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure a SSP/SSAA is established describing the technical, administrative, and procedural IA program and policies governing the DoD information system, and identifying all IA personnel and specific IA requirements and objectives.*

- *(APP2010.2: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure all appointments to required IA roles are established in writing, to include assigned duties and appointment criteria such as training, security clearance, and IT-designation.*

2.1.2 Application Configuration Guide

The overall responsibility for the development of the Application Configuration guide belongs to the Program Manager. The Application Configuration Guide documents the secure deployment of the application being developed. This is critical information to the application hosting providers. The Program Manager will be the liaison between the application hosting providers and the development team and provide system documentation as needed.

The Program Manager may designate an application as critical in the Application Configuration Guide. If designated as a critical application, the application will not be hosted on a general purpose server with other applications.

The Program Manager will identify the list of all potential hosting enclaves in the Application Configuration Guide. The Application Configuration Guide shall also include any interconnected outsourced IT-based processes and interconnected IT platforms with connection rules and requirements.

- *(APP2020.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will provide an Application Configuration Guide to the application hosting providers.*
- *(APP2020.2: CAT II) The Program Manager will provide a list of all potential hosting enclaves and connection rules and requirements.*

2.1.2.1 Standardized Environments

Standard environment settings establish a secure baseline upon which applications are designed to function within the target secured environment. The standardized environments should include each development system, build system, and test system. Standardization should include the software load, system configuration, and network configuration. In addition, all DoD environments and systems will be configured to comply with all appropriate DoD STIGS.

By standardizing the software, any configuration settings interfering with the application can be identified. If the application cannot function with a certain configuration setting enabled, then this fact, as well as an analysis of any potential risks, should be added to the Application Configuration Guide.

- *(APP2020.3: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure development systems, build systems, and test systems have a standardized environment and are documented in the Application Configuration Guide.*

2.1.3 Information Assurance Budget

At the beginning of the development effort the Program Manager will establish a project budget to include all information assurance tasks to be performed on the project and designate personnel to work on the budgeted tasks.

- *(APP2030: CAT III) The Program Manager will ensure a discrete line item for Information Assurance is established in programming and budget documentation at the beginning of the development effort.*

2.1.4 Security Classification Guide

The Program Manager will create a security classification guide if the system contains classified information.

- *(APP2040.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure a security classification guide exists if the system contains classified information.*

2.1.5 Mission Assurance Category and Confidentiality

The Program Manager will determine the Mission Assurance Category (MAC) and Confidentiality (CONF) levels for the application. For example: *This application was designed to operate on MAC II or MAC III systems and handle publicly releasable information only.*

Mission Assurance Category Levels for IA Controls			
MAC	Definition	Integrity	Availability
1	These systems handle information that is determined to be vital to the operational readiness or mission effectiveness of deployed and contingency forces in terms of both content and timeliness.	High	High
2	These systems handle information that is important to the support of deployed and contingency forces.	High	Medium
3	These systems handle information that is necessary for the conduct of day-to-day business, but does not materially affect support to deployed or contingency forces in the short-term.	Basic	Basic

Table 2-1. Mission Assurance Category Levels for IA Control

Confidentiality Levels for IA Control	
Confidentiality Level	DEFINITION
Classified	Systems processing classified information
Sensitive	Systems processing sensitive information as defined in DoDD 8500.01E, to include any unclassified information not cleared for public release
Public	Systems processing publicly releasable information as defined in DoDD 8500.01E (i.e., information that has undergone a security review and been cleared for public release)

Table 2-2. Confidentiality Levels for IA Control

- *(APP2050: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure the system has been assigned specific MAC and CONF levels.*

2.1.6 Coding Standards

Implementing coding standards provides many benefits to the development process. These benefits include readability, consistency, and ease of integration.

Code conforming to a standard format is easier to read, especially if someone other than the original developer is examining the code. In addition, formatted code is easier to read and can be debugged and corrected faster than unformatted code.

Introducing coding standards can help increase the consistency, reliability, and security of the application by ensuring common programming structures and tasks are handled by similar methods, as well as, reducing the occurrence of common logic errors.

Coding standards also allow developers to quickly adapt to code which has been developed by the various members of a development team. Coding standards are useful in the code review process as well as in situations where a team member leaves and duties must then be assigned to another team member.

Coding standards often cover the use of white space characters, variable naming conventions, function naming conventions, and comment styles.

Many organizations have existing coding standards that can be tailored for individual projects.

Language	URL
Java	http://java.sun.com/docs/codeconv/
C# Visual Basic.Net	http://submain.com/?nav=products.guidelines

Table 2-3. Sample Coding Standards

The Program Manager is responsible for obtaining or creating a set of coding standards to be followed by the development team during the SDLC.

- *(APP2060.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure the development team follows a set of coding standards.*

2.1.6.1 Unsafe Functions

The coding standards documentation should also include a list of known unsafe functions. The Program Manager will designate a team member to maintain a list of unsafe functions. Unsafe functions are identified as presenting some risk to the application and should therefore not be used. Appendix B includes examples of functions to avoid for the C and C++ programming languages. Automated checks shall be utilized to identify where these functions are used and to alert developers of their presence. For example in Microsoft Visual C++ warning C4996 indicates an unsafe function call.

- *(APP2060.2: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure the development team creates a list of unsafe functions to avoid and document this list in the coding standards.*

2.2 Third Party Software Products

Third Party software products and libraries may be used in the development of an application. These products and libraries may consist of database management systems, reporting tools, web servers, open source libraries, or a variety of other software products. If the application relies on software products or libraries outside the control of the development team, it is the Program Manager's responsibility to ensure the components comply with the requirements outlined in this document.

2.2.1 NIAP Approved Products

Components being used to provide IA or IA-enabled functionality will, in addition to meeting all the requirements specified in this document, be evaluated in accordance with the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) approval process. For information on the NIAP approval process or NIAP approved products, refer to the following link:

<http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/niap.cfm>.

- *(APP2070.1: CAT III) The Program Manager will ensure any IA or IA-enabled products used by the application are NIAP approved or in the NIAP approval process.*

IA and IA-Enabled Product definitions are provided from the DoD Instruction 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) Implementation, dated February 6, 2003.

<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/850002.htm>

IA Product: Product or technology whose primary purpose is to provide security services (e.g., confidentiality, authentication, integrity, access control, or non-repudiation of data); correct known vulnerabilities; and/or provide layered defense against various categories of non-authorized or malicious penetrations of information systems or networks. Examples include such products as data/network encryptors, firewalls and intrusion detection devices.

IA-Enabled Product: Product or technology whose primary role is not security, but which provides security services as an associated feature of its intended operating capabilities. Examples include such products as security-enabled web browsers, screening routers, trusted operating systems, and security-enabled messaging systems.

2.2.2 Robustness Protection Profiles

Third party software must meet basic, medium, or high robustness security requirements based on the sensitivity of the data.

The robustness requirements for products are defined in the Protection Profile Consistency Guidance for Robustness published under the Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF).

- *(APP2080.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure COTS IA and IA-enabled products, which are used to protect publicly released information, comply with NSA-endorsed Basic Robustness Protection Profiles.*
- *(APP2080.2: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure COTS IA and IA-enabled products are used to protect sensitive information when the information transits Non-DoD-owned networks or the system handling the information is accessible by individuals who are not authorized to access the information on the system, comply with NSA-endorsed Medium Robustness Protection Profiles.*
- *(APP2080.3: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure COTS IA and IA-enabled products are used to protect classified information when the information transits networks that are at a lower classification level than the information being transported, comply with NSA-endorsed High Robustness Protection Profiles.*

More information can be found about Protection Profiles at the following website:

<http://www.niap-ccevs.org/cc-scheme/pp/index.cfm>.

2.2.3 Categories of Third Party Products

There are many classes of software that contain differing licensing, distribution agreements, and warranties.

The DoD memo entitled “Open Source Software in the Department of Defense” dated March 28, 2003 Defines Open Source Software (OSS)

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cio-nii/docs/OpenSourceInDoD.pdf>

Open Source Software: Copyrighted software distributed under a license that provides everyone the right to use, modify, and redistribute the source code of software.

Public Domain Software: Software not protected by any copyright laws providing the right to use, modify, and redistribute without permission or payment to the author.

Shareware: Copyrighted software distributed under a license that provides a trial right to use and redistribute the binaries. For continued usage users are required to pay a fee.

Freeware: Copyrighted software distributed under a license that provides a right to use and redistribute the binaries. Unlike shareware, there is no charge for continued use.

Commercial Software: Copyrighted software sold for profit by businesses also referred to as Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software.

Software products and libraries with limited or no warranty will not be used in DoD information systems unless they are necessary for mission accomplishment and there are no alternative IT solutions available. If these products are required, they must be assessed for information assurance impacts, and must be approved for use by the DAA.

The product assessment addresses the risk of deploying software products with limited or no warranty because of difficulties patching or fixing software without having access to the original source or a vendor actively maintaining the software product.

Software products and libraries not specifically part of, or deployed with the application, are not required to be approved by the DAA. Products include Compilers, Testing Tools, Configuration Management Tools, and other products and libraries part of the application or deployed with the application. However, a risk assessment should be performed on the product or libraries to mitigate potential vulnerabilities.

- *(APP2090.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will obtain DAA approval for all open source, public domain, shareware, freeware and other software products/libraries with limited or no warranty but are required for mission accomplishment.*

Commercial Software and other software products with a warranty do not require DAA approval.

2.3 Ports and Protocols

All port and protocols used within an application must be used in accordance with the DoD Ports, Protocols, and Services (PPS) Assurance Category Assignments List (CAL). Technical guidance on PPS database is available at <https://pnp.cert.smil.mil>. The PPS CAL defines low to high assurance ports and protocols. Ports and Protocols are designated with colors indicating their assurance levels. This guidance discourages the use of low assurance PPS lacking adequate security countermeasures. Ports and protocols may only be used after they have been evaluated by a risk assessment. The mitigations in the vulnerability assessment (VA) reports must be

implemented in order to achieve the assurance level designated in the PPS Assurance Category Assignments List. Vulnerability assessment (VA) Reports can be accessed on the Defense Knowledge Online (DKO) web site. <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/539657>

- *(APP2100.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure the application design complies with the DoD Ports and Protocols guidance.*

All DoD applications are required to be registered in the DoD Ports and Protocols Database.

- *(APP2110.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure the application is registered with the DoD Ports and Protocols Database.*

2.4 Education and Training

Education should be provided to all levels of management, including team leads, Program Managers, and upper management.

A critical step in improving application security is educating managers, designers, developers, and testers. This education should focus on the security aspects of the development process relevant to an individual. It is possible individuals may fall into more than one of the listed categories. In such cases, the individual should receive the training appropriate for all of their job functions.

Additional IA training requirements can be found in DoD Directive 8570.01.
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/857001p.pdf>

Training programs are provided by many vendors.
<http://www.sans.org/training/>

2.4.1 Management

Program Managers need to fully support the effort of secure application development. Without the full support of management this guide may be implemented in a chaotic fashion. It is important Program Managers realize implementing security into the development process will impact the development schedule. Program Managers must be willing to factor the additional time needed into the development schedule as well as be willing to delay the release, or even remove functionality, if it cannot be implemented in a secure manner. An application release should be delayed if the risk level of known vulnerabilities is greater than the need for the deployment of a mission critical application.

- *(APP2120.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure all levels of management receive security training regarding the necessity, impact, and benefits of integrating secure development practices into the development lifecycle.*

2.4.2 Designers

Designers are responsible for decisions ranging from target operating system selection to the functional specification of program features. Since vulnerabilities often appear as result of design decisions, designers should be educated about secure design practices. Since the application vulnerability landscape is continuously evolving, designers should be provided with, at a minimum, annual training to cover newly discovered vulnerability types and to review secure design practices.

- *(APP2120.2: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure designers are provided training on secure design principles for the entire software development lifecycle and newly discovered vulnerability types on at least an annual basis.*

2.4.3 Developers

Developers are responsible for implementing the application design as described by the Designer. In order to implement the design securely, developers need to be educated in secure coding practices. This education should include an overview of known security flaw types, methods of identifying code vulnerabilities, and methods of correcting code vulnerabilities.

Developers should be provided with updated security training on at least an annual basis. This training should review the material presented in the initial training session, and provide information on newly discovered vulnerability types.

- *(APP2120.3: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure developers are provided with training on secure design and coding practices on at least an annual basis.*

2.4.4 Testers

Testers are responsible for ensuring the application meets the established requirements and functions correctly. Both functional testing and security testing should be performed during the testing phase of the software lifecycle.

Testers should be provided with training to enable them to formulate tests and data sets for the application. Training allows them to identify potential security flaws which are necessary to create and execute test plans and procedures. This training should be updated and provided at least once a year.

- *(APP2120.4: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure testers are provided annual training.*

2.5 Application Maintenance

2.5.1 Security Incident Response Process

The incident response process should be put in place to respond to reports of security flaws in the application. This process should include a method for individuals to submit potential security

vulnerabilities to the development or maintenance team. The process should then dictate what is to be done with the reported vulnerabilities. Reported vulnerabilities must be tracked throughout the process to ensure they are triaged, corrected, and tested. The corresponding update is released to the user community. Also, the user community is notified of the availability of the application update.

- *(APP2140.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure a security incident response process for the application is established and defines reportable incidents, outlines a standard operating procedure for incident response to include INFOCON.*

2.5.2 Vulnerability Management Process

An important part of the maintenance phase of an application is managing vulnerabilities for updated versions of the application software discovered after the application was released.

- *(APP2130.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure users are provided with a means of obtaining updates for the application.*

When a security flaw is discovered in an application deployed in a production environment, notification to the user community must take place as quickly as possible. This notification should be planned for by the Program Manager in the design phase of the application. This notification should be a warning of any potential risks to the application or data. A notification mechanism will be established to notify users of the vulnerability and the potential risks, the availability of a solution, or potential mitigations reducing risks to the application.

- *(APP2130.2: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure a mechanism is in place to notify users of security flaws and the availability of patches.*
- *(APP2130.3: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure a comprehensive vulnerability management process including the systematic identification and mitigation of software vulnerabilities is in place.*

2.5.3 Maintenance Availability

As long as the application is supported, maintenance must be available to address any security flaws discovered in the application. New software vulnerability types are discovered on a regular basis, and it is always possible an application previously having no known exploits will have a vulnerability discovered.

The maintenance team does not need to be an active team devoted to the application, but resources must be available to address the flaw in a timely and efficient manner. If maintaining the application is no longer possible, users will be informed when maintenance will be discontinued so they may migrate to another solution. Software no longer under maintenance will be decommissioned and removed.

The application owner and the Program Manager will ensure maintenance is available for all applications hosted in a production environment.

- *(APP2130.4: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure maintenance is available for applications in a production environment.*

2.6 Workplace Security Procedures

The Program Manager is responsible for developing procedures that assure sensitive, classified, FOUO, and other data classification not included, meet the physical data handling and storage requirements.

These procedures should include:

1. end-of-day security checks
 2. unannounced security checks
 3. imposition of a two-person rule within the computing facility (where appropriate)
- *(APP2150.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure procedures are implemented to assure physical handling and storage of information is in accordance with the data's sensitivity.*

2.7 Compliance with DoD Standards

If a DoD STIG is available for one or more components of an application, its guidance will be applied. In addition, security guidance developed for deployment of the application will be applied as indicated in the Application Configuration Guide. The Program Manager should designate a security lead to address security issues found during application development.

- *(APP2160.1: CAT II) The Program Manager will ensure development systems, build systems, test systems, and all components comply with all appropriate DoD STIGS, NSA guides and all applicable DoD policies.*

DoD STIGs are available at the following websites:

DoD IA Portal STIG Page - <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/397960>

DoD IASE - <http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/index.html>

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3. DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT

This section of the document illustrates design related security requirements. The security specific application requirements for this Design section are incorporated by the Application Designers. The high-level application security requirements are handled by cooperation between the Program Manager and the Designer, with the Program Manager having the ultimate decision making authority.

3.1 Documentation

3.1.1 Design Document

The designer is primarily responsible for the development and updates to the application design document. The design document needs to cover many aspects of the application design but should also document the minimal security requirements for sensitive information, external interfaces, roles, access for the roles defined, and any unique security requirements. If the application provides mission and business essential functions, these functions should be identified and prioritized for restoration for continuity planning purposes.

- *(APP3010: CAT II) The Designer will create and update the Design Document for each release of the Application identifying the following:*
 - *all external interfaces (from the threat model)*
 - *the nature of information being exchanged*
 - *categories of sensitive information processed or stored and their specific protection plans*
 - *the protection mechanisms associated with each interface*
 - *user roles required for access control*
 - *access privileges assigned to each role*
 - *unique application security requirements*
 - *categories of sensitive information processed or stored and specific protection plans (e.g., Privacy Act, HIPAA)*
 - *restoration priority of subsystems, processes, or information*

3.1.2 Application Configuration Guide

The developers will provide documentation detailing security controls, best practices, mitigations or concerns. The requirements and recommendations will be documented in the Application Configuration Guide and must be part of the deployment plan.

Any special configuration requirements needed for the application to run will be documented and analyzed for security implications. If a required configuration setting affects the security posture of the system, these configuration settings will be documented in the Application Configuration Guide and provided to the hosting providers of the application. These configuration settings are provided so any risks can be mitigated by taking additional precautions.

- *(APP2020.4: CAT II) The Designer will ensure known security assumptions, implications, system level protections, best practices, and required permissions are documented in the Application Configuration Guide.*
- *(APP2020.5: CAT II) The Designer will ensure deployment configuration settings are documented in the Application Configuration Guide.*

3.1.3 Threat Model

Threat Modeling is the process of identifying potential threats to the application, risk ranking these threats, and selecting appropriate countermeasures or mitigations for the threats. Threat modeling is a critical step in securing an application from attack.

The threat model will be reviewed for each application release and updated as required to reflect the changes in application design and functionality. As potential threats are discovered and the implementation details of the application become known, the threat model will be updated.

The countermeasures identified throughout this process will be implemented according to the guidance provided in the subsequent sections of this document.

- *(APP3020.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure threat models are documented and reviewed for each application release and updated as required by design and functionality changes or new threats are discovered.*
- *(APP3020.2: CAT II) The Designer will identify potential mitigations to identified threats.*
- *(APP3020.3: CAT II) The Designer will ensure appropriate mitigations are implemented to threats based on their risk analysis.*

The following section provides a high level overview of one of the many methods of performing threat modeling. The threat modeling process is described in the book “The Security Development Lifecycle” by Michael Howard and Steve Lipner. There are many other excellent references available on the process of threat modeling, and it is recommended the reader of this guide refer to one of these references for more in-depth coverage of the topic. The Microsoft Developers Network Blog (<http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/tags/threat+modeling/default.aspx>) provides useful information about threat modeling and techniques.

3.1.3.1 Define Common Usage

The Designer should document the most common usage scenarios for the application and the user types. This helps drive appropriate mitigations.

3.1.3.2 Identify External Dependencies

External dependencies are defined as anything outside the control of the development team and which the application depends upon. Examples of external dependencies include, but are not limited to:

- Other computer systems
- Databases
- External data feeds or telemetry

When enumerating external dependencies, specify the version numbers, and configuration requirements of the dependencies.

3.1.3.3 Enumerate Security Assumptions

A security assumption is an assumption made about the operating environment of the application for the secure operation of the product. These assumptions may include, but are not limited to:

- Operating System or application configurations. For example, expected file permissions on the system or IP restrictions on a Web Server.
- Additional software or Application Program Interfaces (API) available on the system. For example, the presence of a specific cryptographic library.
- Environmental conditions. For example, the presence of a firewall between the application and the network.
- Presence of infrastructure components, such as authentication servers and VPN concentrators.

All security assumptions identified should be documented as the information may need to be provided to users and administrators to help ensure the security of the application.

3.1.3.4 Identify Objects and Interactions

The next threat modeling step is to identify all of the objects in the application. Objects will fall into the following categories:

- Processes- A logical representation: The performance of discrete tasks or activities. Examples include the authentication component of a daemon or a rendering component in a browser.
- External Entities: Something acting upon the application and outside the control of the application. Examples include system users and external processes.
- Data Stores: Persistent data storage such as files and databases.
- Data Flows: Means by which data moves throughout the system.
- Boundaries: Identifies where information or process control passes between areas of different trust levels, systems, physical locations or address spaces.

It is important to identify all objects involved in the application, as the rest of the threat modeling process relies on the proper identification of these objects. It is recommended to construct Data

Flow Diagrams (DFD) to represent visual models of the system. Microsoft Visio can be used to create DFD diagrams to model the system.

3.1.3.5 Identify Entry Points

Identify the entry points of the system being modeled. These are locations where the system provides or gathers data on behalf of external entities. Sample entry points include:

- TCP ports
- UDP ports
- RPC end points
- web server pages
- database listeners
- mail server ports

To identify potential threats, enumerate each entry point discovered earlier and determine what kind of access is offered by the entry point. Access types are defined across two axes. The first is network accessibility:

- Local machine access
- Local Subnet access or access limited set of addresses
- Remote access

The second axis measures authentication and authorization requirements for the entry point:

- Anonymous access (no authentication and no authorization)
- Access limited to non-administrative accounts
- Access limited to administrative accounts

The program management team and development team should rank all the entry points into the system from most accessible to least accessible. The most accessible entry points pose the highest degree of risk to the application.

After identifying access points, threats to these entry points and to the underlying application must be ascertained. Each element in the application is subject to attack, for example data flows are subject to specific threats, and processes are subject to others.

Threats can be categorized in order to help identify potential mitigations. There are a variety of categorizations used when enumerating attacks. This document explains the Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege (STRIDE). Other examples of threat categorization include Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). STRIDE focuses on the method of categorization, and CIA focuses on security qualities. Information regarding different categorization methodologies may be found in books or magazines.

- Spoofing: Allows an attacker to pose as a different entity.

- Tampering: The malicious modification of data or code.
- Repudiation: An entity denying having performed an action.
- Information Disclosure: Data or code being revealed to an inappropriate entity.
- Denial of Service: Prevents a valid entity from accessing an application or system.
- Elevation of Privilege: Allows an entity to execute code or access data at a privilege level above the entity.

Processes are subject to all STRIDE threats. Data stores and data flows are subject to tampering, information disclosure, denial of service, and potentially repudiation if the data is logging or audit data. Finally, external entities are subject to spoofing and repudiation threats.

Every threat identified will fall into one or more of the above listed categories.

Microsoft provides a thread modeling tool which utilizes the STRIDE methodology of threat modeling. This modeling tool can be found at:

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=62830f95-0e61-4f87-88a6-e7c663444ac1&displaylang=en>

3.1.3.6 Determine Threat Risk

After identifying potential threats, they should be evaluated and ranked to ensure the most critical threats may be addressed first. There are many different ranking formulas available, and the methodology presented in this document is not the only viable ranking formula.

One of the simplest formulas is $Risk(R) = Damage\ Potential\ (D) \times Chance\ of\ Attack\ (C)$. While this formula may work, it is often difficult to assess the proper value to assign to C , since this will change as new attacks and technologies become available.

A critical topic to take into consideration is end-point accessibility. The more accessible an end-point, the higher the likelihood of attack at the end-point.

Every potential threat identified in the previous step should be ranked using the same criteria in order to address the highest risk threats first.

Threat tree patterns are useful to determine the security-related pre-conditions that could lead to security threats. Please refer to Howard and Lipner for details about threat tree patterns.

It is often helpful to construct threat trees to help in ranking potential threats. A threat tree is a specialized form of a decision tree breaking a high-level threat into the individual components or steps necessary to exploit the vulnerability. Using the leaf nodes of the tree it is possible to develop a better value for C and also potentially prune branches of the tree. Threat trees are also helpful in selecting mitigations for vulnerability. The creation of threat trees is beyond the scope of this document, however many excellent resources on this topic exist on the Internet or in books.




Figure 3-1. Sample Threat Tree

3.1.3.7 Identify Potential Mitigations

For every threat identified there are several potential solution categories from which to choose:

- Warn the user – Leave the threat unmitigated, but warn the user. Warning the user does not remove the threat, and too many warnings lead to user’s becoming “fatigued”, so use warning judiciously.
- Disable the feature – Disable the feature, making it an optional application function. This is not a recommended course of action as the threat will still exist if the feature is enabled. Make sure users are aware of the security implications of the feature if it is enabled.
- Remove the feature – If it is impossible to implement a feature securely, it may be necessary to remove the feature rather than putting users at risk.
- Technological solution – There are often technical controls utilized to mitigate the threat.

A solution should be chosen for each threat identified and a document detailing all of the information generated should be created. This completed document is the threat model for the application.

3.1.4 Coding Standards

The development team will follow the coding standards either created or provided by the Program Manager. The development team may be involved in tailoring coding standards of an organization to the specific project.

- *(APP2060.3: CAT II) The Designer will follow the established coding standards established for the project.*

3.1.4.1 Unsafe Functions

The unsafe functions documented in the coding standards will be avoided in the development phase of the application. Automated tools may be used to search and document cases of unsafe use.

- *(APP2060.4: CAT II) The Designer will not use unsafe functions documented in the project coding standards.*

3.2 Using Static Analysis Tools

It is highly recommended that all software developed for DoD use be developed with the aid of static analysis tools. Such tools can find many vulnerabilities faster than humans can, although they often suffer from issuing numerous false positives.

3.3 Third Party Products

If the application relies on third party software products or libraries selected by the development team, it is both the Program Manager's and development team's responsibility to ensure the components comply with all requirements in this document.

3.3.1 NIAP Approved Products

In addition to meeting all the requirements specified in this document, products being used to provide IA or IA-enabled functionality will be evaluated in accordance with the NIAP approval process. For information on NIAP approval process or NIAP approved products, refer to the following link: <http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/niap.cfm>.

- *(APP2070.2: CAT III) The Designer will ensure any IA or IA-enabled products used by the application are NIAP approved or in the NIAP approval process.*

3.3.2 Categories of Third Party Products

Software products and libraries with limited or no warranty will not be used in DoD information systems unless they are necessary for mission accomplishment and there are no alternative IT solutions available. If these products are required, they must be assessed for information assurance impacts and be approved for use by the DAA.

The product assessment addresses the risk of deploying software products with limited or no warranty because of difficulties patching or fixing software without having access to the original source or a vendor actively maintaining the software product.

- *(APP2090.2: CAT II) The Designer will document for DAA approval all open source, public domain, shareware, freeware, and other software products/libraries with limited or no warranty but are required for mission accomplishment.*

3.4 Application Registration

Depending of the branch of service the application being developed may be required to be registered in several locations. The individual registration requirements for each of the military services are not addressed in this document.

3.4.1 Ports and Protocols

All DoD applications must be registered in the DoD Ports and Protocols Database.
<https://pnp.cert.smil.mil>

While an application may be written to utilize any ports and/or protocols securely, the DoD has established guidelines regarding the use of certain ports and protocols crossing enclave boundaries. The application in a DoD environment will comply with the guidance provided in the PPS CAL. <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/396114>

Open ports, especially anonymously accessible ports should be carefully reviewed to determine if an authenticated end point is more appropriate.

- *(APP2100.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application design complies with the DoD Ports and Protocols guidance.*
- *(APP2110.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application is registered with the DoD Ports and Protocols Database.*

3.5 Best Practices

The establishment of various best practices is an important aspect of a secure development environment. These best practices will provide consistent quality code when developing custom applications.

Source code never executed by the application will be removed from the application. Software components and libraries from approved third party products may contain code never invoked during operation.

Many compilers offer compile time and runtime protections against stack and buffer overflows. These compile time options should be enabled wherever possible. Visual C++ allows the use of “/GS (stack base overflows),” and “/SAFESEH (secure exception handling),/NXCOMPAT

(hardware-based” options for software-enforced data execution prevention (DEP) also referred to as NX) and /DYNAMICBASE (image and stack randomization.)

- *(APP3050: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application does not contain source code never invoked during operation.*
- *(APP3060: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application does not store configuration and control files in the same directory as user data.*
- *(APP3070: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the user interface services are physically or logically separated from data storage and management services.*
- *(APP3080: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application does not contain invalid Uniform Resource Locator (URL) or path references.*
- *(APP3090: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application supports detection and/or prevention of communication session hijacking.*
- *(APP3100: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application removes temporary storage of files, memory, and cookies when the application is terminated.*

3.5.1 Secure Defaults

The practice of secure defaults helps to ensure the application is deployed in a secure state. This practice implies unneeded or potentially unsafe functionality is disabled by default, and the user must explicitly enable the functionality when required.

As part of secure defaults, the installation process should also assist to ensure any system configuration requirements and system level protections identified earlier are documented for the user or configured during the installation process. If default accounts are created as part of the application installation, the installation process will include a method of changing the passwords associated with these accounts.

- *(APP3110: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application installs with unnecessary functionality disabled by default.*

3.5.2 Error Handling

Improper error handling in an application can lead to an application failure, or possibly result in the application entering an insecure state. Improper error handling is usually not directly attackable, unless a method of repeatedly causing the application to fail is discovered. If such a method is discovered it is possible for an attacker to cause a Denial of Service (DoS), or to potentially exploit the insecure state of the application. The more likely effect of improper error handling is a self-inflicted DoS or random cases of the application entering an insecure state.

The following items may indicate potential error handling issues:

- Failure to check return codes or handle exceptions
- Improper checking of exceptions or return codes
- Handling all return codes or exceptions in the same manner
- Error information that divulges potentially sensitive data to an un-trusted user.

The primary way to detect error handling vulnerabilities is to perform code reviews. If a manual code review cannot be performed, static code analysis tools should be employed in conjunction with tests to help force the error conditions by specifying invalid input (such as fuzzed data and malformed filenames) and by using different accounts to run the application. These tests may give indications of vulnerability, but they are not comprehensive.

In order to minimize error handling errors, ensure proper return code and exception handling is implemented throughout the application.

- *(APP3120: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application is not subject to error handling vulnerabilities.*

3.5.3 Fail Closed

In order to minimize error handling, and ensure proper return code, exception handling is implemented throughout the application. The secure “Fail Closed” principle should be implemented.

This principle helps ensure predictable and secure application behavior in case of application failures. Applications often perform checks on the validity of data, user permissions and resource existence before performing a function. Secure failure is defined as if a check fails for any reason, the behavior of the application remains in a secure state. The following pseudo-code provides a simple example of a secure failure:

```

If CheckAccessDenied()
    Display Error Message ()
    DenyAccess ()
Else
    Perform Privileged Action ()
Endif

```

In the example above, if the *Check Access Denied* function encounters an error while running and does not return “TRUE” (for example, the function returns an “Out of memory” error), the privileged action is performed. While this example is very simple, complex behaviors are often modeled in an application, and it is important the most secure code branch is executed in the event of an application error. The application code should provide exception handling thereby leaving the application in a secure state.

The principle of secure failure design is intended to account for all possible exceptions leaving the application in a vulnerable state. Coding constructs vary from programming language to

programming language. The example above only illustrates the basic concept of secure failure design.

- *(APP3130: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application follows the secure failure design principle.*
- *(APP3140: CAT II) The Designer will ensure application initialization, shutdown and aborts are designed to keep the application in a secure state.*

3.6 Cryptography

Through this section, we will use the term, “protected with appropriate cryptography” to mean:

- Use of symmetric ciphers to protect data from disclosure.
- Use of Message Authentication Codes, hashes, or digital signatures to protect data from tampering.
- Use of digital signatures to provide data authentication.

3.6.1 FIPS 140-2

If cryptographic technologies are not implemented correctly it may be possible for an attacker to protected data. The designer will use FIPS certified algorithms. FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules can be found at the following website: <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf>. Annex A: Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules can be obtained at the following website: <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402annexa.pdf>

- *(APP3150.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application uses FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules to implement encryption, key exchange, digital signature, and hash functionality.*

For classified data, cryptographic modules will be NSA approved cryptographic modules.

3.6.2 NSA Approved Cryptography

NSA has developed Type 1 algorithms for protecting classified information. [National Information Assurance Glossary](#) (CNSSI No. 4009) defines Type 1 products.

Cryptographic equipment, assembly or component classified or certified by NSA for encrypting and decrypting classified and sensitive national security information when appropriately keyed. Developed using established NSA business processes and containing NSA approved algorithms are used to protect systems requiring the most stringent protection mechanisms.

NSA approved cryptography is required to be used for classified information system processing.

3.6.3 Random Number Generation

Applications that use weak random numbers for security purposes are vulnerable to attack.

Use a FIPS 140-2 approved random number generator when the random number is to be used for cryptographic or security purposes. The list of approved random number generators can be obtained from the NIST website. <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402annexc.pdf>.

- *(APP3150.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application uses a FIPS 140-2 validated random number generator to support cryptographic functions.*

Random number generators not used in support of cryptographic functions are not required to be FIPS 140-2 validated.

NIST FIPS-validated cryptography as a baseline with additional NSA random number generation services.

Note: Encryption requirements for data at rest are covered by two categories:

1. Unclassified systems require FIPS 140-2 encryption modules.
2. Classified systems require NSA/COMSEC-approved Type-1 encryption.

3.6.4 Key Exchange

A common key exchange vulnerability is when the ends of a communication channel do not perform mutual authentication before exchanging a key, keys, or keying material. Without mutual authentication it may be possible to perform a Man-In-The-Middle attack and intercept/modify the key communications or subsequent communications.

The following items may indicate key exchange vulnerabilities in an application:

- Use of in-house developed key exchange or authentication protocols.
- Key exchange is not part of the authentication protocol.
- Key exchange not including authentication of the both parties.

Use an established authentication protocol to minimize key exchange vulnerabilities.

- *(APP3170: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application uses encryption to implement key exchange and authenticate endpoints prior to establishing a communication channel for key exchange.*

Note: Encryption requirements for data at rest are covered by two categories:

1. Unclassified systems require FIPS 140-2 encryption modules.
2. Classified systems require NSA/COMSEC-approved Type-1 encryption.

- *(APP3180: CAT II) The Designer will ensure private keys are accessible only to administrative users.*

3.7 Data

Improper data handling, storage and transmission can lead to information disclosure or malicious modification. Depending on what information is disclosed and/or modified, the consequences may be insignificant or could result in a system compromise or sensitive data leakage.

3.7.1 Database Management System

Many applications are designed with a third party Database Management System (DBMS) for data storage and retrieval. Additional requirements are placed on applications using DBMS COTS packages. The Database STIG imposes additional requirements on DBMS.

<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/397960>

- *(APP3190: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application does not connect to a database using administrative credentials or other privileged database accounts.*
- *(APP3200: CAT III) The Designer will ensure transaction-based applications implement transaction roll-back and transaction journaling.*

3.7.2 Data Storage

The data owner may elect to require certain information be treated as sensitive data. If required, this data must be protected using appropriate cryptography.

- *(APP3210.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure NIST-certified cryptography is used to protect stored sensitive information if required by the information owner.*
- *(APP3210.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure NIST-certified cryptography is used to store classified non-SAMI information if required by the information owner.*

If a classified enclave contains Sources and Methods Intelligence (SAMI) data, this data must be protected using appropriate cryptography.

- *(APP3210.3: CAT II) The Designer will ensure a classified enclave containing SAMI data is encrypted with NSA-approved cryptography.*

Any application storing sensitive data to a database or data file in the operating system will cryptographically protect the data before storage in a database or data file.

- *(APP3210.4: CAT II) The Designer will ensure sensitive data is cryptographically protected when held in a data store.*

Note: Encryption requirements for data at rest are covered by two categories:

1. Unclassified systems require FIPS 140-2 encryption modules.
2. Classified systems require NSA/COMSEC-approved Type-1 encryption.

3.7.3 In-Memory Data Handling

In order to minimize in-memory data handling disclosure vulnerabilities in the application implement the following procedures:

- Encrypt sensitive data held in physical or virtual memory when not being used.
 - Clear all memory blocks used to process sensitive data prior to releasing the memory.
 - Revoke access authorizations to data prior to initial assignment, allocation, or reallocation to an unused state so information produced by a previous user is not available to a subsequent user that obtains access to an object that has been released back to the system.
 - Ensure that memory clearing code is not removed by the compiler when compiler optimization is selected.
 - Use memory clearing in supporting development environments. (e.g., SecureSting in the .Net Framework Class Library)
- *(APP3220: CAT II) The Designer will ensure sensitive or classified data held in memory is cryptographically protected when not in use.*
 - *(APP3230: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application properly clears or overwrites all memory blocks used to process sensitive data.*
 - *(APP3240: CAT II) The Designer will ensure all access authorizations to data are revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or reallocation to an unused state.*

3.7.4 Data Transmission

In order to minimize data transmission disclosure or manipulation vulnerabilities in the application implement the following procedures:

- Protect all sensitive data and unclassified data transmitted on a commercial (non-DoD) or wireless network using appropriate cryptography.
- Protect all classified data when network is cleared for lower classification.
- Encrypt all data need-to-know data separated for need-to-know reasons.
- Encrypt all SAMI data in transit through a network at the same classification level.

Classified data transmitted through a network, which is cleared to a lower level than the data being transmitted, is separately encrypted using NSA-approved cryptography.

Unclassified, sensitive data transmitted through a commercial or wireless network is encrypted using NIST-certified cryptography.

- *(APP3250.1: CAT I) The Designer will ensure unclassified, sensitive data transmitted through a commercial or wireless network is protected using NIST-certified cryptography.*

- *(APP3250.2: CAT I) The Designer will ensure classified data, transmitted through a network that is cleared to a lower level than the data being transmitted, is separately protected using NSA-approved cryptography.*

Data in transit through a network at the same classification level separated for need-to-know reasons will be encrypted minimally with NIST-certified cryptography.

SAMI data in transit through a network at the same classification level will be encrypted using NSA-approved cryptography.

- *(APP3250.3: CAT II) The Designer will ensure information in transit through a network at the same classification level, but which must be separated for need-to-know reasons, is protected minimally with NIST-certified cryptography.*
- *(APP3250.4: CAT II) The Designer will ensure SAMI information in transit through a network at the same classification level is protected with NSA-approved cryptography.*

Note: Encryption requirements for data in transit are covered by two categories:

1. Unclassified systems require FIPS 140-2 encryption modules.
2. Classified systems require NSA/COMSEC-approved Type-1 encryption.

3.7.5 Data Integrity

Custom developed solutions should implement data integrity checks for incoming and outgoing files, such as parity checks and cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs). Mechanisms should be put in place to assure the integrity of all transmitted information including labels and security parameters and to prevent the hijacking of a communication session.

- *(APP3260.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application supports mechanisms assuring the integrity of all transmitted information (including labels and security parameters).*
- *(APP3260.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application supports integrity mechanisms for incoming and outgoing files, such as parity checks and CRCs.*

3.7.6 Data Marking

If the application is designed to handle non-publicly releasable data, it will mark all output. Output includes, but is not limited to: video display, printed materials, database exports, and files. Proper labeling of data is the responsibility of the data creator or the application developer. Guidelines for appropriate marking can be found in DoD 5200.1-R Information Security Regulation and DoD 5200.1-PH DoD Guide to Marking Classified Documents.

- *(APP3270: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application has the capability to mark sensitive/classified output when required.*

3.8 Authentication

Authentication is a security mechanism designed to verify a user or other service authorization to access the application. Authentication is an important safeguard against the unauthorized access and use. Authentication establishes a trust mechanism between the user or other service and the application.

The sample application shown in the figure 3-2 has many potential authentication points. Many factors need to be considered to determine which potential authentication points are required to safeguard the application.

All applications and access points should be examined to determine if additional access control is required and the type of authentication. Adding authentication has a benefit of reducing the amount of code that is accessible to un-trusted users.

Sample Application - Potential Authentication Points




Figure 3-2. Sample Potential Authentication Points

3.8.1 Types of Authentication

3.8.1.1 Server Authentication

When server authentication is required it must be performed using DoD PKI credentials or those authorized under the DoD External Certificate Authority (ECA) program or Federal Bridge Certificate Authority (FBCA) or CCEB Interoperability Certificate Authority users.

3.8.1.2 User Authentication

If application users are required to be authenticated then this authentication must be performed using DoD PKI credentials or those authorized under the DoD ECA program. Certain applications providing read-only public releasable information may not be require user authentication.


3.8.1.3 Signed Code Identification

All signed code must be signed with a DoD PKI mobile code signing certificate. Signed code certificates must be validated as indicated in the PKI Certificate Validation section before they are executed on a workstation.

3.8.2 Application Architecture Types

This section addresses authentication requirements based on the application architecture and access control requirements places on the data stored in the application.

3.8.2.1 Standalone Application Authentication



All authentication can be provided by the operating system

Figure 3-3. Standalone Applications

Standalone applications are applications that do not provide, and do not use, network or application services. These applications do not interact with the network in any capacity. Standalone applications can make use of operating system authentication to control access to the application and its resources. These applications are protected by the operating system authentication and no other authentication mechanisms are required.


Examples:

Notepad (e.g., notepad.exe on Windows)

Calculator (e.g., calc.exe on Windows)

3.8.2.2 Server Application Authentication

Client & Server Applications



Authentication needed to protect the client application can be provided by the operating system.

Authentication may need to be provided for server applications bypassing underlying operation system user authentication.

Figure 3-4. Client & Server Applications

Server applications are applications providing a service to remote users. These applications provide application or network services to their client applications on the network.

Examples

FTP Server

Apache Web Server (serving only static data)

These applications may or may not require authentication based on the data being served. Refer to the Application Components section for details.

3.8.2.3 Client Application Authentication

Client applications provide an interface to server applications. These client applications may be web browsers or traditional client-server applications with each client being physically installed on each user's workstation requiring access. These types of applications do not provide an application or network services.

Examples:

Outlook
Internet Explorer
Netscape

These applications are protected by the authentication provided by the operating system. These applications may need to support authentication to access other server applications; however, they are protected by the operating system login.

3.8.2.4 Combination Client Server Application Authentication




Figure 3-5. Client Server Combination Applications

Most applications do not fit into solely server or client applications. Many applications have both server components and client components. Applications can be decomposed into server components and client components and each must be analyzed separately for authentication requirements.

Examples:

Tomcat Application Server
WebLogic Application Server

3.8.2.5 Application Component Authentication

All server application and server components data need to be examined to determine if access control mechanisms are required for data access. If the application data or data owner requires

additional access control then user authentication must be implemented. This information will already be documented in the application's design document.

User Authentication and authorization is not required for the following situations:

- Reading publicly releasable information

User Authentication and authorization is required for the following situations:

- Modifying any class of information
- Reading or modifying any information deemed to be sensitive by the data owner
- Reading or modifying any Classified or Sensitive Information
- Any privileged access

3.8.3 PKI Authentication

PKI authentication is outlined in DoD Instruction 8520 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling. <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/852002p.pdf>
The following requirements were obtained from this instruction:

This instruction is applicable to all DoD unclassified and classified information systems including networks such as, Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network, Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, web servers, and e-mail systems. Excluded are Sensitive Compartmented Information, and information systems operated within the Department of Defense.

Also, this instruction states *the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence Directive*

The DoD Components shall enable DoD information systems, including networks, email, and web servers, to use certificates issued by the DoD PKI and approved external PKIs as appropriate to support authentication, access control, confidentiality, data integrity, and nonrepudiation.

The DoD Components that conduct web server-based transactions with information privileged individuals, volunteers, or Reservists involving the transfer of personal information, shall use encryption to ensure confidentiality of these transactions, and shall require, at a minimum, that the information-privileged individual present a user-id and password.

Web servers accessed by DoD eligible users and DoD Partners shall be enabled to use certificates for authenticating users and to support access control decisions.

DoD private web servers providing access to DoD sensitive information except those protecting access to personal information by information-privileged individuals shall be PK-Enabled to rely on certificates for client authentication issued by DoD-approved PKIs.

Web servers protecting access to personal information for information-privileged individuals, volunteers, and Reservists do not require client certificate authentication, but shall at a minimum require userid and password-based authentication. Other information systems shall consider the use of certificates for authenticating users.

Information systems residing behind web servers requiring authorization based on individual identity shall use the identity provided by certificate-based authentication to support access control decisions.

All DoD networks required to authenticate users shall perform this authentication using certificates issued by the DoD PKI on hardware tokens (e.g., the Common Access Card (CAC) or an equivalent assurance level DoD PKI token).

The CAC shall be the primary token for protecting private keys associated with identity, signature, and encryption certificates issued by the DoD PKI. Alternative hardware tokens may be approved by the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO where justified.

The CAC is the primary token for the NIPRNET. However, there are currently no approved hardware tokens for the SIPRNET.

Note: Any PKI requirements currently not supported by the PKI Program Office are not required to be implemented. As the PKI feature not supported becomes available these PKI requirements are to be implemented.

Authentication Example – Private Web Server




Figure 3-6. Private Web Server Example

In this example, the web application user sends the web server their credentials for authentication. The web server forwards the web application user's credentials to the application server and the application server performs authentication of the web server user. The application server sends authentication credentials of a predefined database user and the database server authenticates the database user. Both the application administrator and the database administrator authenticate to the application server and database server respectively.

Authentication Example – Public Web Server




Figure 3-7. Public Web Server Example

Note: This is an example configuration and will not represent optimal configuration for every environment.

Authentication Example – Client/Server Application




Figure 3-8. Client/Server Application

Note: This is an example configuration and will not represent optimal configuration for every environment.

3.8.3.1 PKI User Authentication

All applications requiring authentication will comply with DoD Instruction 8520 Public Key Infrastructure and Public Key Enabling.

- *(APP3280.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure applications requiring user authentication are PK-enabled.*

Note: All applications must be PK-enabled although in certain cases of information privileged individuals, volunteers, or Reservists involved with the transfer of personal information may minimally authenticate using password based authentication. All other users including administrative users must authenticate using PKI user authentication. As the DoD PKI Program provides DoD CACs to these groups of individuals, these users will also be required to authentication using DoD PKI.

Applications hosted on the SIPRNet are required to be PK-enabled and should support and use credentials authorized under the DoD PKI program. Hardware tokens for the SIPRNet will be implemented as soon as they are authorized for use.

- *(APP3280.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure applications requiring user authentication are designed and implemented to support hardware tokens (e.g., CAC for NIPRNet).*
- *(APP3290.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure PK-enabled applications are designed and implemented to use approved credentials authorized under the DoD PKI program.*

3.8.3.2 PKI Server Authentication

All authentication and identification is required to be accomplished using credentials authorized under the DoD PKI program. If a web server is required to authenticate with the client application, the authentication must be PK-enabled.

- *(APP3300: CAT II) The Designer will ensure applications requiring server authentication are PK-enabled.*

3.8.3.3 PKI Certificate Validation

When validating credentials authorized under the DoD PKI program the following requirements apply:

- Validate the certificate has not expired.
- Validate the certificate is used for its intended use.
- Validate the certificate is from a trusted DoD authorized CA
- Validate the chain of trust or path for a certificate
- Validate the certificate has not been revoked using either Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
 - If caching the CRL, the cache will be updated at least daily.
 - Reject the certificate if its certificate status is not available or current
- *(APP3305: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application using PKI validates certificates for expiration, confirms origin is from a DoD authorized CA and verify certificate has not been revoked by CRL or OCSP and CRL cache is updated at least daily.*

3.8.4 Password Authentication

PK-Enabled applications using public and private key certificates for authentication are not required to implement password authentication, enforced password complexity and maintenance requirements.

All applications that use password based authentications are required to be PK-Enabled to support authentication using the DoD CAC for application administrators and all other users. DoD web servers that conduct transactions involving the transfer of personal information with privileged individuals, volunteers, or Reservists, minimally require such individuals to use

password authentication by PKI authentication. However, the use of password based authentication is discouraged.

Password authentication may be used as an underlying certificate-to-user account mapping mechanism. If password authentication is used, password complexity and maintenance requirements must still be enforced.

For applications that must use them, such as is noted in this paragraph, a PKI-based, dual logon mechanism in addition to the password-based logon is strongly encouraged.




Figure 3-9. Password Authentication Example

Note: DoD Instruction 8520.2 states:

“The DoD Components that conduct web server-based transactions with information privileged individuals, volunteers, or Reservists involving the transfer of personal information, shall use encryption to ensure confidentiality of these transactions, and shall require, at a minimum, that the information-privileged individual present a user-id and password.”

Password based authentication systems must comply with the following:

- *(APP3310: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application does not display account passwords as clear text.*

3.8.4.1 Password Complexity and Maintenance

Account passwords must comply with the following:

- Passwords must be at least 15 characters long.
 - Passwords must contain a mix of upper case letters, lower case letters, numbers, and special characters.
 - When a password is changed, the user must not be able to use personal information such as names, telephone numbers, account names, or dictionary words.
 - Passwords must expire after 60 days.
 - The user must not be able to reuse any of their previous 10 passwords.
 - The user must not be able to change passwords more than once a day except in the case of an administrator or privileged user. Privileged users may be required to reset user's forgotten passwords and the ability to change passwords more than once per day.
 - When a password is changed, the new password must differ from the previous password by at least four characters.
-
- *(APP3320.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application has the capability to require account passwords having a minimum of 15 alphanumeric characters in length.*
 - *(APP3320.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application has the capability to require account passwords contain a mix of upper case letters, lower case letters, numbers, and special characters.*
 - *(APP3320.3: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application has the capability to require account passwords be changed every 60 days or more frequently.*
 - *(APP3320.4: CAT II) The Designer will ensure passwords do not contain personal information such as names, telephone numbers, account names, or dictionary words.*
 - *(APP3320.5: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application has the capability to limit reuse of account passwords within the last 10 password changes.*
 - *(APP3320.6: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application has the capability to limit user changes to their account passwords once every 24 hours with the exception of privileged or administrative users.*
 - *(APP3320.7: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application has the capability to require new account passwords differ from the previous password by at least four characters when a password is changed.*

3.8.4.2 Password Transmission

In general, password use is highly discouraged in favor of PKI authentication. However, if applications transmit account passwords, they must be transmitted in an encrypted format. Applications that transfer passwords should be thoroughly analyzed for security weaknesses.

- *(APP3330: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application transmits account passwords in an approved encrypted format.*

Note: Encryption requirements for data in transit are covered by two categories:

1. Unclassified systems require FIPS 140-2 encryption modules.
2. Classified systems require NSA/COMSEC-approved Type-1 encryption.

3.8.4.3 Password Storage

It is very difficult to protect stored secrets including passwords, so storing passwords is discouraged. In many instances, verifying the user knows a password is performed using a password verifier. In its simplest form, a password verifier is a hash of a password. A more secure version of verifying a user knows a password is to store the result of an iterating hash function and a large random salt value:

$$H_0 = H(\text{pwd}, H(\text{salt}))$$

$$H_n = H(H_{n-1}, H(\text{salt}))$$

Where n is a very large number, at least 100,000. H_n is stored, along with the salt. When the application wishes to verify the user knows a password it simply repeats the process and compares H_n with the stored H_n .

If an application must store a password, the password must be encrypted using an appropriate encryption function, key and salt, and the encryption key stored in a secure location accessible only to trusted users and applications.

- *(APP3340: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application stores account passwords in an approved encrypted format.*

*Note Encryption requirements for data at rest are covered by two categories:

- Unclassified systems require FIPS 140-2 encryption modules.
- Classified systems require NSA/COMSEC-approved Type-1 encryption.

3.8.5 Authentication Credentials Protection

Embedding authentication data such as passwords, usernames, and private keys in an application executable or data stores could lead to unauthorized access to other application or system resources.

The following items may indicate potential embedded authentication data issues:

- Usernames, passwords, and private keys are stored in the executable.
- Usernames, passwords, and private keys are stored in a user accessible data store.

The primary way of identifying embedded authentication data is through reviews of the application source code, data stores, binary files, and installation routines.

In order to eliminate embedded authentication data in the application, implement the following procedures:

- Use operating system protection mechanisms for securely storing sensitive data.
- Ensure strong access control permissions on data files containing sensitive information.
- Use appropriate cryptographic defenses when storing authentication data.
- *(APP3350: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application does not contain embedded authentication data.*
- *(APP3360: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application protects access to authentication data by restricting access to authorized users and services.*

3.8.6 User Accounts

The Designer will ensure the application installation procedures installs the application with critical application accounts enabled and any unnecessary accounts disabled or deleted by default.

- *(APP3370: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application installs with unnecessary accounts disabled or deleted by default.*

The application will provide a mechanism to ensure duplicate user account names are not created. Using operating systems functions to manage user accounts may prohibit the creation of duplicate accounts.

- *(APP3380: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application prevents the creation of duplicate accounts.*

The application should allow only three consecutive incorrect logon attempts in a one hour period prior to locking the account.

- *(APP3390: CAT I) The Designer will ensure users accounts are locked after three consecutive unsuccessful logon attempts within one hour.*

The application should only allow the application administrator to manually unlock an application accounts. The application administrator should have a policy to confirm the user identity through secret questions and other mechanisms before unlocking the locked users account.

- *(APP3400: CAT II) The Designer will ensure locked user accounts can be unlocked by the application administrator.*

3.8.7 Sessions

The application should provide system definable parameters for the following

- The total number of user sessions open for the entire application.
- The total number of concurrent sessions that can be opened by a single user.
- The total amount of idle time before the user session is forced to terminate.

These system defined parameters may vary greatly with the type of application being developed. There are no upper or lower bounds required for these parameter but they must be configurable on deployment of the application.

Session implementations must comply with the following:

- If the application allows multiple logon sessions, the application should limit the number of user sessions to the system defined parameter.
 - The application should limit the total number of sessions across all users. to the system defined parameter.
 - A capability to terminate a session and logout must be provided.
 - A capability to terminate a session and logout after system defined session idle time limit has been exceeded must be provided.
 - Authentication credentials must be removed on client computers after a session terminates.
- *(APP3410.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application provides a capability to limit the number of logon sessions per user.*
 - *(APP3410.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application provides a capability to limit the total number of logon sessions for the application.*
 - *(APP3415: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application provides a capability to automatically terminate a session and logout after a system defined session idle time limit is exceeded.*
 - *(APP3420: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application provides a capability to terminate a session and logout.*
 - *(APP3430: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application removes authentication credentials on client computers after a session terminates.*

3.8.8 Logon Banner

The Policy on Use of DoD Information Systems Standard Consent Banner and User Agreement Memorandum requires the use of a standard Notice and Consent Banner. One of two standard banners to be used based on the character limitations imposed by the system. The banner is mandatory and deviations are not permitted except as authorized in writing by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Information and Identity Assurance.

Use the following banner for desktops, laptops, and other devices accommodating banners of 1300 characters. The banner shall be implemented as a click-through banner at logon (to the extent permitted by the operating system), meaning it prevents further activity on the information system unless and until the user executes a positive action to manifest agreement by clicking on a box indicating "OK.". The text of this banner should be customizable in the event of future updates, so those deploying the application can reconfigure the application with any additional banner updates.

You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only.

By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions:

- The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations.
- At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS.
- Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose.
- This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests--not for your personal benefit or privacy.
- Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details.

For Blackberries and other PDAs/PEDs with severe character limitations use the following banner.

I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't.

- *(APP3440: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application is capable of displaying a customizable warning message prior to user logon.*

3.9 Access Control

An access control flaw exists if a user or process can view or modify data to which they should not be permitted. This could result in situations ranging from information disclosure to system compromise and could potentially result in the compromise of other systems on the network.

The following items may indicate inadequate access control:

- Objects are created and protected using custom permissions.
- Configuration files readable and/or modifiable by users.

In order to minimize access control flaws in an application implement the following procedures:

- Specify the restrictive permission sets for objects on creation.
- Protect application configuration and executable files with the permission sets allowing only the application administrator to modify these files.
- *(APP3450.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure application resources are protected with permission sets which allow only an application administrator to modify application resource configuration files.*

3.9.1 Name Resolution

A name resolution vulnerability exists when an application trusts the results of a name resolution service such as the hosts file, DNS or WINS, as the sole means of authenticating a server or client. Since there are many, well-known vulnerabilities in these protocols, most notably a lack of server authentication and protections on the resulting data, it is possible for an attacker to compromise the name resolution service and redirect the application to an alternate host. Depending on the design of the application, redirecting the application can lead to issues ranging from information disclosure to application compromise.

The following items may indicate name resolution vulnerabilities in an application:

- Using name resolution as the only means of identifying a server.
- Using name resolution as the only means of identifying a client.

Testing should be performed by configuring a malicious server and/or client, intentionally causing the name resolution to redirect to the malicious server/client and examining the behavior of the application when it is connected to the wrong system.

In order to minimize name resolution vulnerabilities, implement the following procedures:

- Use a cryptographic method of verifying the identity of a system prior to establishing any trust relationship.
- Preferred methods are established protocols such as TLS, SSL or IPSec.

- *(APP3460: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application does not rely solely on a resource name to control access to a resource.*

3.9.2 Role Based Access

The application should be divided into functionality based on roles. Users will be assigned to specific roles.

- *(APP3470.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application is organized by functionality and roles to support the assignment of specific roles to specific application functions.*

The user roles will determine which functionality the user can access. The application should provide access control mechanisms to ensure users only have access to data or information for the role they have been granted.

- *(APP3480.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure access control mechanisms exist to ensure data is accessed and changed only by authorized personnel.*
- *(APP3480.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the access procedures enforce the principles of separation of duties and "least privilege".*

3.9.3 Excessive Privileges

An application executing with more privileges than are required for it to function is considered to have excessive privileges and is violating the "Principle of Least Privilege." Applications. An application with excessive privileges greatly increases the risk to the system in the event the application suffers a security breach. The type of attack performed will vary based on the privileges granted to the application account.

The following items may indicate the presence of excessive privileges in an application:

- Applications executing as Administrator, System, root or any other privileged accounts.
- Applications requesting full control when accessing resources.
- Applications should drop unnecessary privileges in modules when no longer required.

The primary methods of detecting excessive privileges are threat modeling and code reviews.

In order to minimize excessive privileges used by an application, implement the following procedures:

- Identify all resources the application needs to access, and ensure permissions or ACLs are in place.
- Identify what type of access each user role needs for a resource, and ensure proper permissions or ACLs are in place.
- Identify any special privileges needed by the application.
- Where possible, run as the Local Service or Network Service accounts instead of SYSTEM (Windows).

- Remove all unneeded privileges from the process token when the process starts.
- *(APP3500: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application executes with no more privileges than necessary for proper operation.*

3.10 Input Validation

A major cause of software vulnerabilities is failure to validate un-trusted input. Any data crossing a trust boundary, as identified in the threat modeling process, will be checked to ensure validity before being used. Input may come from a user, data store, network socket, or other source.

When validating data the application will check for known-good data and reject any data not meeting these criteria. Checking for known-bad data may still allow an attacker to get bad data through the validation by using alternate data encoding or patterns the developers have not considered. Allowing only known-good data through may increase the possibility of valid data being rejected; however, this significantly lessens the possibility of invalid data being passed on to the application.

- *(APP3510: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application validates all user input.*
- *(APP3520: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application validates data from any source when it crosses a trust boundary.*

For web applications, setting the character set on the web page reduces the possibility of receiving unexpected input that uses other character set encodings by the web application.

- *(APP3530: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the web application assigns the character set on all web pages.*

3.10.1 SQL Injection Vulnerabilities

A SQL Injection vulnerability allows an attacker to modify a database query to access or modify data to which they are not permitted. SQL Injection vulnerabilities are exploited through un-validated user input.

The following items may indicate potential SQL Injection vulnerabilities in an application:

- Un-validated user input utilized to build queries or as parameters to stored procedures.
- Use of string concatenation to build queries.
- Use of string replacement to build queries.
- Use of SQL exec function.

The primary method of detecting SQL Injection vulnerabilities is a code review. It is critical that all SQL-based applications be thoroughly code reviewed for SQL injection vulnerabilities.

In order to minimize SQL Injection vulnerabilities implement the following procedures:

- Use static analysis tools that are known to find this class of vulnerability with few false positives.
 - Validate all user input, allowing only known good input through.
 - Use prepared or parameterized statements.
 - Do not use string concatenation or string replacement to build SQL queries.
 - Allow access to the database through views not directly to underlying tables in the database.
 - Use `sp_executesql` and `quotename` inside stored procedures to help ensure input is valid (Microsoft SQL Server).
- *(APP3540.1: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application is not vulnerable to SQL Injection.*
 - *(APP3540.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application uses prepared or parameterized statements.*
 - *(APP3540.3: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application does not use concatenation or replacement to build SQL queries.*
 - *(APP3540.4: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application does not directly access the tables in a database.*

3.10.2 Integer Arithmetic Vulnerabilities

Integer arithmetic vulnerabilities result from inconsistent and/or incorrect results from calculations due to the handling of integer data types. These errors can lead to symptoms ranging from crashes and incorrect results to allowing an attacker to exploit buffer overflows. There are three kinds of integer arithmetic issues that could lead to security vulnerabilities:

- Signed vs. unsigned mismatches (for example, comparing a signed integer to an unsigned integer)
- Truncation (for example, incorrectly truncating a 32-bit integer to a 16-integer)

Underflow and overflow (for example, the sum of two numbers exceeds the largest possible value for the integer size in question)

The following items may indicate the presence of integer overflows in the application:

- Mixing signed and unsigned data types in calculations or comparisons.
- Mixing data types of different sizes in calculations or comparisons.
- Comparisons between variables and literal values.
- Use of un-validated input.
- Calculations not validated before the result is utilized.

The primary method of detecting integer overflows in an application is a code review. It is critical that all dynamic memory allocations and array indexing that uses arithmetic be code

reviewed for correctness. The following items list some of the tests to be performed to help uncover integer-related vulnerabilities.

- Input negative values for numeric input.
- Input border case values (i.e., 0, 7, 8, 254, 255, 16353, 16354).
- Input extremely large string values (> 64k).
- Input strings whose lengths equal border cases (32k, 32k-1, 64k, 64k-1).

As a general best practice, fuzz testing can uncover many integer-related vulnerabilities.

In order to minimize integer overflows implement the following procedures:

- Use static analysis tools that are known to find this class of vulnerability with few false positives.
 - Use unsigned values whenever possible.
 - Use only unsigned integers in memory allocation.
 - Use only unsigned array indexing functions.
 - Validate user input of numeric value, allowing only known good data to pass.
 - Compile with the highest warning level possible.
 - (C++) Use `size_t` types to hold size variables.
 - (C++) Use the `SafeInt` class available from Microsoft.
 - (C#) Compile with the `/checked` compiler option.
 - (GCC) Compile with the `-ftrapv` option.
- *(APP3550: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application is not vulnerable to integer arithmetic issues.*

3.10.3 Format String Vulnerabilities

Format string vulnerabilities occur when specially crafted format strings passed to a function allow flow control information to be viewed or modified. In a worst-case scenario, format string vulnerabilities can allow an attacker to execute code of their choice on the system, resulting in complete system compromise. The primary avenue of attack for format string vulnerabilities is un-validated input.

An application taking input and passing it to a formatting function may indicate the presence of format string vulnerabilities. The primary method of detecting this vulnerability is a source code review or use of static analysis tools.

The `%p` (pointer) specifier should be used with caution, and the `%n` (number of characters written) should be avoided.

To test the application, insert format string specifiers in all areas of string input and observe the output looking for anomalies. The format specifiers will vary based upon the language used; however, in addition to language specific specifiers, the C and C++ language specifiers should also be tested.

In order to minimize format string vulnerabilities, implement the following procedures:

- Use static analysis tools that are known to find this class of vulnerability with few false positives.
 - Validate all input before passing it to a function, allowing only good data to pass.
 - Format strings used by the application should only be accessible by privileged users.
 - (C++) Use stream operators instead of the printf family of functions.
 - (GCC) compile with -Wformat -Wformat-security to detect insecure use of format strings
 - Compile with Microsoft Visual C++ 2005 and later to detect insecure use of format strings at run time
- *(APP3560: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application does not contain format string vulnerabilities.*

3.10.4 Command Injection Vulnerabilities

Command injection attacks are attempts to inject unwanted data into an application for the purpose of executing operating system shell commands. This can allow an attacker to execute code, possibly at a higher privilege level, resulting in system compromise. Command injection vulnerabilities are most often exploited through unvalidated input.

Potential Command Injection vulnerabilities include the use of functions spawning an interpreter or compiler. (Table 4-1 lists some common functions vulnerable to Command Injection)

Language	Functions/Characters
C/C++	system(), popen(), execlp(), execvp(), ShellExecute(), ShellExecuteEx(), _wsystem()
Perl	system, exec, ` ,open, l, eval, /e
Python	exec, eval, os.system, os.popen, execfile, input, compile
Java	Class.forName(), Class.newInstance(), Runtime.exec()

Table 3-3. Functions Vulnerable to Command Injection

In addition to code reviews, testing should be performed to help identify Command Injection vulnerabilities. In order to test for Command Injection vulnerabilities:

- Identify all potential interpreters or compilers used to pass data.
- Identify the characters modifying the interpreters' behavior.
- Construct input strings containing these characters causing a visible effect on the system, pass them to the application and observe the behavior. Ensure all input vectors are tested in this manner.

In order to minimize Command Injection vulnerabilities, validate all input before passing to an interpreter or compiler, allowing only known good input through and use static analysis tools that are known to find this class of vulnerability with few false positives.

- *(APP3570: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application does not allow Command Injection.*

3.10.5 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities

XSS is a vulnerability where input is accepted by a website and then sent back through a web page. This input can include code, such as JavaScript, to be executed by the user's browser. Since this code is seen as originating from the web server it can access data from the servers' domain such as a cookie, or modify the behavior of the webpage by modifying links and other malicious actions. A cross site scripting vulnerability can lead to an attacker gaining personal information or directing a user to a site of the attacker's choice.

If user input is echoed back into the browser, the application may have potential XSS issue.

Note: This data may go through intermediate processes before being sent back to a browser.

In addition to code reviews, testing should be performed to identify potential XSS vulnerabilities. In order to test for XSS vulnerabilities:

- Make a request against the application, setting all input parameters to known-bad values.
- View the HTML response, looking for the known-bad values sent as input. The response containing the values submitted as input may not be returned immediately, but may be sent in response to a future request or possibly to a different entity.

In order to minimize XSS vulnerabilities in the application, implement the following procedures:

- Use static analysis tools that are known to find this class of vulnerability with few false positives.
 - Validate all input, allowing only known good input
 - If special characters are required for input, HTML encode user input
 - Set a known character set for all web pages to eliminate unexpected characters
- *(APP3580: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application does not have Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities.*

3.10.6 Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities

A buffer overflow is a vulnerability where data is written beyond the end of an allocated memory block or below an allocated block (a buffer under flow). There are several types of buffer overflows, all leading to the same potential issues in the application; the ability to crash the application or execute arbitrary code on the system. If the vulnerable application is running as

an elevated account such as system or the root account, this could lead to a compromise of the system. Buffer overflows are usually exploited through unvalidated input.

The following items may indicate potential buffer overflows within the application:

- Cases where input is not checked before being copied into a buffer.
- Incorrect use of some of the functions listed in Appendix B.
- Incorrect calculations to determine buffer sizes (see 3.9.2).
- Incorrect calculations to determine array indexes (see 3.9.2).

The primary methods of detecting buffer overflows are code reviews and Fuzzers. Fuzz testing is the process of sending large and invalid data blocks as input to an application in an attempt to cause an application error.

In order to minimize buffer overflows implement the following procedures:

- Use static analysis tools that are known to find this class of vulnerability with few false positives.
- Validate all input before use, allowing only known-good input through.
- Replace known-insecure functions with safer functions. (See Appendix B)
- Recheck all calculations to ensure buffer sizes are calculated correctly.
- Recheck all array access and flow control calculations.
- (C++) Replace character arrays with STL string classes.
- Use compile-time options that add compiler buffer overrun defenses. For example in Visual C++ 2005 Service Pack 1 and later, use /GS, /SAFESEH, /NXCOMPAT and /DYNAMICBASE; in gcc 4.1.2-25 and later, use the `-stack-protector` option.
- *(APP3590.1: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application does not have buffer overflows.*
- *(APP3590.2: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application does not use functions known to be vulnerable to buffer overflows.*
- *(APP3590.3: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application does not use signed values for memory allocation where permitted by the programming language.*

3.11 Canonical Representation

Canonical representation issues arise when the name of a resource is used to control resource access. There are multiple methods of representing resource names on a computer system. An application relying solely on a resource name to control access may incorrectly make an access control decision if the name is specified in an unrecognized format.

For example, in Windows notepad.exe may be represented by the following file and path name combinations:

```
C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
```

```
%SystemRoot%\System32\notepad.exe  
\\?\C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe  
\\host\c$\Windows\system32\notepad.exe
```

An application attempting to restrict access to the file based solely on the file path and name may improperly grant or deny access. The same issue may apply to other named resources on a system such as a hard- and soft-links, URL, pipe, share, directory, device name, or within data files if alternate encoding mechanisms are used with the data.

The following items may indicate potential canonical representation issues in an application:

- Access control decisions based upon a resource name.
- Failure to reduce a resource name to its canonical form before use.

In order to minimize canonical representation issues in the application, implement the following procedures:

- Do not rely solely on resource names to control access.
 - If using resource names to control access, validate the names to ensure they are in the proper format; reject all names not fitting the known-good criteria.
 - Use operating system based access control mechanisms such as permissions and ACLs.
- *(APP3600: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application has no canonical representation vulnerabilities.*

3.12 Hidden Fields in Web Pages

A “hidden” field vulnerability results when hidden fields on a web page, values in a cookie, or variables included in the URL can be used for malicious purposes. While these fields are not normally visible or editable by the user of a web browser, they can be viewed and/or modified by looking at the source. Unencrypted hidden fields can be used provided they cannot be used maliciously.

The following items may indicate the presence of hidden field vulnerabilities in the application:

- HTML being sent to the client including a form field(s) where type=HIDDEN, type = 'HIDDEN' or type = "HIDDEN".
- The application uses values stored in a cookie to elevate user access privileges.
- The application uses variables in the URL to elevate user access privileges.

The primary method of detecting hidden fields is to view the HTML sent to clients and search for the HIDDEN specifier. Hidden fields used in an application must be examined to determine if the disclosure or modification of the hidden values will have an adverse effect on the application, application data, or the user.

Implement the following procedures to minimize hidden field vulnerabilities:

- Remove hidden elements from web pages if they are not needed.
- Do not use hidden elements to store values effecting user access privileges.
- *(APP3610: CAT I) The Designer will ensure the application does not use hidden fields to control user access privileges or be used as part of security mechanism.*

3.13 Application Information Disclosure

Information disclosure vulnerabilities are leaks of information from an application which are used by the attacker to perform a malicious attack against the application. This information itself may be the target of an attacker, or the information could provide an attacker with data needed to compromise the application or system in a subsequent attack. Information disclosure vulnerabilities are most often the result of programming errors, insufficient authentication, poor error handling, or inadequate data protection.

The following items may indicate the presence of information disclosure vulnerabilities in the application:

- Information about the operating environment is disclosed to a user.
- Information about a user's operating environment is disclosed to another user.
- Output not marked at the appropriate classification level.
- Data access requests are not subject to permission checks.
- Error messages revealing information to the users through their wording or timing.
- Application responses revealing internal information to the user through their wording or timing.
- Authentication error messages identifying userids on the system.

The primary method of identifying information disclosure vulnerabilities is to perform a code review. In addition to a code review the application may be tested by:

- Inducing errors in the program to verify the contents of error messages.
- Attempting variations of invalid input combinations to determine if the response contents or timing reveal information about the system. For example, is the response time or error message different for an invalid username/invalid password and a valid username/invalid password combination? If so this would allow an attacker to find valid usernames.
- Attempting to access data the user should not be able to access.

In order to minimize Information Disclosure vulnerabilities:

- Ensure an access control policy is in place to enforce access control of the data.
- Display generic error messages to end users
- Log specific error information for application administrators
- Ensure the application responses do not divulge unneeded details.

- *(APP3620: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application does not disclose unnecessary information to users.*

3.14 Race Conditions

A race condition occurs when two applications, processes, or threads attempt to manipulate the same object. The effects of a race condition can range from an application crash to a compromise of the system. Race conditions occur when developers do not consider what will happen if another entity modifies an object while in use.

The following items may indicate a potential race condition in an application:

- Global objects and resources.
- Multiple threads or processes are accessing the same object.
- Resources created in common areas.
- Overly permissive ACLs.

The primary method of identifying race conditions is through a code review. Testing may also be performed to help identify race conditions. Finding race condition through testing can be very difficult as they are often time critical. When testing, you should run the application as quickly as possible, preferably on a multi-processor system, launch multiple instances of the application, and send data to the application as quickly as possible.

Implement the following procedures to minimize race condition vulnerabilities:

- Minimize the use of global variables.
 - Use thread-safe and reentrant version of functions.
 - Ensure ACLs are enforced on application resources that restrict the users who can access the protect resources
- *(APP3630.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application is not vulnerable to race conditions.*

Any race conditions specifically contributed by the operating system itself should also be documented. These vulnerabilities should be immediately reported to the operating system vendor for resolution.

- *(APP3630.2: CAT III) The Designer will ensure the application does not use global variables when local variables could be used.*

The designer will use thread safe functions when threads accessing the same object or data in a multithreaded application.

- *(APP3630.3: CAT II) The Designer will ensure a multi-threaded application uses thread safe functions when threads are accessing the same object or data.*
- *(APP3630.4: CAT II) The Designer will ensure global resources are locked before being accessed by the application.*

3.15 Auditing

Auditing is the process of monitoring and recording events to provide accountability, track usage, and alert the administrator of potential problems. As part of the design process, auditing requirements and capabilities will be established for the application. A design decision to use third party products or external auditing capabilities (Operating System, Database, and Web Server) must be documented. The auditing capabilities provided by the external component must meet the minimum requirements specified.

This section details the minimum level of auditing required for a DoD application. Applications may require additional auditing to comply with legal requirements, or to satisfy other custom requirements going beyond the basic security requirements that are included in this document.

Auditing capabilities, whether provided by an external component or the application itself, will meet the following minimum requirements in this section.

- *(APP3640: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application supports the creation of transaction logs for access and changes to the data.*

3.15.1 Audit Notifications

The auditing system will provide an alert to administrative personnel when the audit log sizes are approaching their limits. Warnings may be accomplished by using appropriate operating system functions or network monitoring functions. A custom application is not necessarily required to be developed to implement warnings to administrators.

- *(APP3650: CAT III) The Designer will ensure the application has a capability to notify an administrator when the audit logs are nearing capacity as specified in the system documentation.*

The Designer will ensure the application has a capability to notify the user on login:

- Date and time of the user's last unsuccessful logon
 - IP address of the user's last unsuccessful logon
 - Date and time of the user's last successful logon
 - IP address of the user's last successful logon
 - Number of unsuccessful logon attempts since the last successful logon
- *(APP3660: CAT III) The Designer will ensure the application has a capability to notify the user on login of Date and time of the user's last unsuccessful logon, IP address of the user's last unsuccessful logon, Date and time of the user's last successful logon, IP address of the user's last successful logon, and number of unsuccessful logon attempts since the last successful logon.*
 - *(APP3670: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application has a capability to display the users time and date of the last change in data content.*

3.15.2 Access for Need-to-Know

Access to need-to-know information requires individual authentication with authorized or validated need-to-know access established. All access to need-to-know information will be audited.

- *(APP3680.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application design includes audits on all access to need-to-know information.*

Restricted access to need-to-know information is made available only to an authorized community of interest. Authorized users must present an individual authenticator and have either an authorized or validated need-to-know.

- *(APP3680.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application logs all failed access attempts to need-to-know information.*

3.15.3 Audit Record Content

The minimum contents for audit records are based on data classifications of:

- Classified
- Sensitive
- Publicly Releasable

Some events may not be collected automatically, and may be required to be captured through a manual method such as blocking a terminal or userid.

3.15.3.1 Publicly Releasable Audit Record Content

- *(APP3680.3: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application's publicly releasable data audit records include:*
 - *User ID*
 - *Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access security files*
 - *Date and time of the event*
 - *Type of event*

3.15.3.2 Sensitive Audit Record Content

- *(APP3680.4: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application's sensitive data audit records include:*
 - *User ID*
 - *Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access security files*
 - *Date and time of the event*
 - *Type of event*
 - *Success or failure of event*
 - *Successful and unsuccessful logons*
 - *Denial of access resulting from excessive number of logon attempts*

- *Blocking or blacklisting a user ID, terminal or access port and the reason for the action*
- *Activities that might modify, bypass, or negate safeguards controlled by the system*

3.15.3.3 Classified Audit Record Content

- *(APP3680.5: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application's classified data audit records include:*
 - *User ID*
 - *Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access security file*
 - *Date and time of the event*
 - *Type of event*
 - *Success or failure of event*
 - *Successful and unsuccessful logons*
 - *Denial of access resulting from excessive number of logon attempts*
 - *Blocking or blacklisting a user ID, terminal or access port, and the reason for the action*
 - *Activities that might modify, bypass, or negate safeguards controlled by the system*
 - *Data required to audit the possible use of covert channel mechanisms*
 - *Privileged activities and other system-level access*
 - *Starting and ending time for access to the system*
 - *Security relevant actions associated with periods of activity where security labels or categories of information are processed or changed*

3.15.4 Audit of Security Label Changes for Classified Data

The application automatically records the creation, deletion, or modification of confidentiality or integrity labels, if required by the information owner.

- *(APP3680.6: CAT III) The Designer will ensure the application creates an audit trail for addition, deletion or change of the confidentiality or integrity labels as designated by the information owner.*

3.15.5 Audit Trail Protection

The contents of audit trails are protected against unauthorized access, modification, or deletion.

- *(APP3690.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the audit trail is readable only by the application and auditors.*
- *(APP3690.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the audit trail is protected against modification or deletion except by application and auditors.*

3.16 Mobile Code

The DoD Instruction 8552.01 establishes and implements policy on using mobile code in DoD information systems.

The instruction defines mobile code as “software obtained from remote systems, transferred across a network, and then downloaded and executed on a local system without explicit installation or execution by the recipient.” Mobile code falling outside the scope of the mobile code policy is not exempt to the security requirements contained in this document or other STIGs.

Mobile code originating from and traveling exclusively within a single enclave boundary is exempt from the requirements of the mobile code policy.

The mobile code policy can be found on the following website:

<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/855201.htm>

3.16.1 Category 1 Mobile Code

There are two subgroups of Category 1 mobile code technologies:

- Category 1A
- Category 1X

3.16.1.1 Category 1A Mobile Code

The use of Category 1A digitally signed mobile code is allowed in DoD information systems.

All Category 1A mobile code that resides on DoD-owned or DoD-controlled servers shall be digitally signed with a DoD code-signing certificate prior to being installed on the servers.

All Category 1A mobile code which was signed with a code-signing certificate shall be obtained from a trusted source and designated as trusted by the recipient’s Component.

All Category 1A mobile code's digital signature is properly validated by the client runtime environment prior to the execution of the mobile code.

The following mobile code technologies are assigned to Category 1A:

- ActiveX controls
- Shockwave movies (including Xtras)

The use of unsigned Category 1A mobile code in DoD information systems shall be prohibited.

- *(APP3700.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure unsigned Category 1A mobile code is not used in the application.*
- *(APP3700.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure Category 1A mobile code used in an application is signed with a DoD-approved code-signing certificate.*

- *(APP3700.3: CAT II) The Designer will ensure signed Category 1A mobile code used in an application is obtained from a trusted source and is designated as trusted.*
- *(APP3710.1: CAT II) The Designer will ensure signed Category 1A mobile code signature is validated before executing.*

Signed Mobile Code may need to be periodically signed again as the certificate expires.

3.16.1.2 Category 1X Mobile Code

The following mobile code technologies are assigned to Category 1X:

- Mobile code scripts executing in Windows Scripting Host (WSH) (e.g., JavaScript, VBScript downloaded via URL file reference or email attachments). When JavaScript and VBScript execute within the browser, they are Category 3; however, when they execute in WSH, they are Category 1.
 - HTML Applications (e.g., hta files) downloaded as mobile code.
 - Scrap objects (e.g., .shs and .shb files).
 - Windows and Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS) batch scripts (.cmd and .bat).
 - UNIX shell scripts.
 - Binary executables (e.g., .exe files) downloaded as mobile code.
- *(APP3700.4: CAT II) The Designer will ensure Category 1X mobile code is not used in applications.*

3.16.2 Category 2 Mobile Code

The following mobile code technologies are assigned to Category 2:

- Java applets and other Java mobile code
- Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) (e.g., Microsoft Office macros, also used by Corel Office)
- LotusScript (e.g., Lotus Notes scripts)
- PerfectScript (e.g., Corel Office macros)
- Postscript
- Mobile code executing in .NET Common Language Runtime

3.16.2.1 Category 2 Mobile Code in Constrained Environment

Unsigned Category 2 mobile code executing in a constrained execution environment without access to local system and network resources (e.g., file system, Windows Registry, network connections other than to its originating server) may be used in DoD information systems.

- *(APP3720: CAT II) The Designer will ensure unsigned Category 2 mobile code executing in a constrained environment has no access to local system and network resources.*

3.16.2.2 Category 2 Mobile Code not in Constrained Environment

The DoD Instruction 8552.01 states “Category 2 mobile code not executing in a constrained execution environment may be used in DoD information systems if the mobile code is obtained from a trusted source over an assured channel using at least one of the following measures:

- Code Signing: The mobile code was digitally signed with a code-signing certificate that is designated as trusted by the recipient’s Component. The mobile code’s digital signature is properly validated by the client runtime environment prior to the execution of the mobile code.
- SSL Connection: The mobile code was downloaded over an SSL connection from a trusted SSL Web server using a DoD or trusted commercial SSL server certificate.
- TLS Connection: The mobile code was downloaded over a TLS connection from a trusted TLS Web server using a DoD or trusted commercial TLS server certificate.
- IPsec Combined with Mutual Authentication: The mobile code was downloaded from a trusted Web server over an encrypted IPsec connection that establishes mutual authentication using a DoD or trusted commercial certificate.”
- *(APP3700.5: CAT II) The Designer will ensure signed Category 2 mobile code used in an application is signed with a DoD-approved code-signing certificate.*
- *(APP3700.6: CAT II) The Designer will ensure Category 2 mobile code not executing in a constrained execution environment is obtained from a trusted source over an assured channel using at least one of the following measures:*
 1. *The mobile code was digitally signed with a code-signing certificate that was designated as trusted by the recipient’s Component.*
 2. *The mobile code was downloaded over an SSL connection from a trusted SSL Web server using a DoD or trusted commercial SSL server certificate.*
 3. *The mobile code was downloaded over a TLS connection from a trusted TLS Web server using a DoD or trusted commercial TLS server certificate.*
 4. *The mobile code was downloaded from a trusted Web server over an encrypted IPsec connection that establishes mutual authentication using a DoD or trusted commercial certificate.*

*Note: In an SSL, TLS or IPsec connection the application is susceptible to downloading malicious code from phishing attacks on applications having XSS errors.

- *(APP3710.2: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the signed Category 2 mobile code signature is validated before executing.*

Signed Mobile Code may need to be periodically signed again as the certificate expires.

3.16.3 Category 3 Mobile Code

Category 3 mobile code technologies may be used without restrictions in DoD information systems.

The following mobile code technologies are assigned to Category 3:

- JavaScript, including Jscript and ECMAScript variants, when executing in the browser
- VBScript, when executing in the browser
- Portable Document Format (PDF)
- Flash animations (e.g., .swf and .spl files) executing in the Shockwave Flash Plugin

3.16.4 Emerging Mobile Code

The DoD Instruction 8552.01 states “Emerging mobile code technologies refer to all mobile code technologies, systems, platforms, or languages whose capabilities and threat level have not yet undergone a risk assessment and have not been assigned to one of the a risk categories above. Because of the uncertain risk, the use of emerging mobile code technologies in DoD information systems is prohibited.”

- *(APP3730: CAT II) The Designer will ensure uncategorized or emerging mobile code is not used in applications.*

If an emerging mobile code technology is used by a DoD application, the DoD organization shall nominate the mobile code technology to undergo a risk assessment performed by NSA.

3.16.5 Mobile Code in Email

Applications embedding mobile code in email attachments should only use mobile code which does not automatically execute when the user opens the email message and the email attachment.

- *(APP3740: CAT II) The Designer will ensure the application only embeds mobile code in email that does not execute automatically when the user opens the email body or attachment.*

3.16.6 New Procurement and Development Efforts

All development of new types of mobile code technologies require a mobile code risk mitigation plan detailing the measures incorporated to mitigate the risk.

- *(APP3750: CAT II) The Designer will ensure development of new mobile code includes measures to mitigate the risks identified.*

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4. SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

Software Configuration Management (SCM) is the process of controlling software by managing the versions of all components and their relationships. All system software must be approved by the configuration control board. The Release Manager has the primary responsibility of software configuration management.

Adherence to the SCM process will limit unauthorized individuals from accessing and making unauthorized modifications and potentially malicious changes to code.

- *(APP4010: CAT III) The Release Manager will ensure the access privileges to the CM repository are reviewed every three months.*
- *(APP4020: CAT III) The Release Manager will ensure the defect tracking system used allows items to be marked as security defects.*

4.1 Software Configuration Management Plan

The Release Manager will develop a configuration management plan to include the following:

- *(APP4030.1: CAT II) The Release Manager will develop an SCM plan describing the configuration control and change management process of objects developed and the roles and responsibilities of the organization.*
- *(APP4030.2: CAT III) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan identifies all objects created during the development process subject to configuration control.*
- *(APP4030.3: CAT II) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan maintains procedures for identifying individual application components, as well as, entire application releases during all phases of the software development lifecycle.*
- *(APP4030.4: CAT III) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan identifies and tracks all actions and changes resulting from a change request from initiation to release.*
- *(APP4030.5: CAT III) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan contains procedures to identify, document, review and authorize any change requests to the application.*
- *(APP4030.6: CAT III) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan defines the responsibilities, the actions to be performed, the tools, techniques and methodologies, and defines an initial set of baselined software components.*
- *(APP4030.7: CAT III) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan objects have security classifications labels.*
- *(APP4030.8: CAT II) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan identifies tools and version numbers used in the software development lifecycle.*

- *(APP4030.9: CAT III) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan identifies mechanisms for controlled access of simultaneous individuals updating the same application component.*
- *(APP4030.10: CAT II) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan assures only authorized changes by authorized persons are possible.*
- *(APP4030.11: CAT III) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan identifies mechanisms to control access and audit changes between different versions of objects subject to configuration control.*
- *(APP4030.12: CAT II) The Release Manager will ensure the SCM plan identifies mechanisms to track and audit all modifications of objects under configuration control. Audits will include the originator and date and time of the modification.*

4.2 Configuration Control Board

The Release Manager will establish a Configuration Control Board (CCB) to manage the CM process. The IAM will be a member of the CCB. The CCB will meet regularly to determine the priority change requests. The CCB determines when the change requests will be implemented. The Program Manager should designate a security lead to be part of the CCB.

- *(APP4040.1: CAT II) The Release Manager will establish a CCB managing the CM process.*
- *(APP4040.2: CAT II) The Release Manager will ensure the IAM is a member of CCB.*
- *(APP4040.3: CAT III) The Release Manager will ensure the CCB meets at least every release cycle or more often.*

5. TESTING

The application testing process is vital in identifying security flaws before the application is released. In addition to the standard functional testing performed, the development team will have at least one tester specifically testing the application for security flaws.

- *(APP5010: CAT III) The Test Manager will ensure at least one tester is designated to test for security flaws in addition to functional testing.*
- *(APP2160.2: CAT II) The Test Manager will ensure both client and server machines are STIG compliant.*
- *(APP5030: CAT II) The Test Manager will ensure the application does not modify data files outside the scope of the application.*

The Test Manager will create, document, and perform test cases for changes in the application.

- *(APP5040: CAT II) The Test Manager will ensure the changes to the application are assessed for IA and accreditation impact prior to implementation.*

5.1 Test Plans and Procedures

The Test Manager will create and update test plans and procedures for each production application release.

- *(APP5050: CAT II) The Test Manager will ensure tests plans and procedures are created and executed prior to each release of the application or updates to system patches.*
- *(APP5060: CAT II) The Test Manager will ensure tests procedures are created and at least annually executed to ensure system initialization, shutdown, and aborts are configured to ensure the system remains in a secure state.*

5.2 Fuzz Testing

Fuzz testing is a testing method that can help uncover reliability and security vulnerabilities in a software product. Fuzz testing relies on building or manufacturing deliberately malformed data and then having the application under test consume the data, this can often lead to an application crash; and percentage of the crashes are in fact security vulnerabilities.

It is important that all critical applications, most notably those facing the Internet or those that consume and parse files be fuzzed.

- *(APP5100: CAT III) The Test Manager will ensure fuzz testing is included in the test plans and procedures and performed for each application release based on application exposure.*

5.3 Code Coverage

An important aspect of all testing methods, including fuzz testing, is code coverage achieved through the testing process. Code coverage is the percentage of the application code exercised during the testing process. Security flaws often occur in areas of the code not regularly executed, so it is important to keep track of how often a code branch is executed and tested to ensure thorough testing is performed. If code coverage is low, then the tests must be evaluated to determine why code coverage is low, and the tests changed to increase the percentage of code covered by the test cases.

- *(APP5070: CAT III) The Test Manager will ensure code coverage statistics are maintained for each release of the application.*

5.4 Code Reviews

A code review is the process of reviewing application code to locate potential problems with functionality. Security flaws should also be identified during the code review. Any security flaws found will be entered into the defect tracking system, clearly identified as a security defect, and fixed before the application is released. Code reviews cannot be conducted on third party libraries or products. Code reviews may be automated or manual, and there are many commercial companies offering code review services. The most comprehensive reviews will implement two or more of the review types.

Application reviewers are objective parties holding no responsibilities of developing the application being certified and accredited. The application reviewer should have a strong background in the languages used by the application, as well as, training in identifying security flaws.

If the code is considered proprietary, the application developers will need to provide evidence a code review was performed on the code base and all code review related requirements are reviewed.

Also the threat modeling process should feed the code review process so more significant threats receive higher priority and attention than less significant threats.

- *(APP5080: CAT II) The Test Manager will ensure a code review is performed before the application is released.*
- *(APP5090: CAT II) The Test Manager will ensure flaws found during a code review are tracked in a defect tracking system.*
- *(APP5110: CAT II) The Test Manager will ensure security flaws are fixed or addressed in the project plan.*

5.4.1 Automated Code Review

Automated code reviews can quickly identify weak areas of an application. Depending on the sophistication of the analysis, static analysis tools may be prone to false positives and may miss some classes of security defect. Automated code review procedures should be put in place to disqualify false positives and manually check for security vulnerabilities the tool fails to identify. Static analysis tools are valuable if the code is very large, but it is not a replacement for manual code review. There should be manual code review for exposed code, such as network-facing code and mobile code.

5.4.1.1 Static Analysis Tools

Static Analysis Tools should provide:

- Support for programming languages required.
- Scan for vulnerabilities and report vulnerabilities with a minimum of false positives and false negatives.
- Support a centralized security policy management so all scans use established policies.
- Scan for malicious code detection.
- Support the use of an underlying DBMS to collect, report, export and analyze scan results.
- Provide remediation for vulnerabilities found.
- Provide measurement metrics for long term trending of applications.
- Enable collaboration between security teams and development and QA.
- Customization capabilities to accommodate unique coding styles.
- Correlate dynamic testing to assist in the prioritization of static results.

There are many commercially available static analysis tools. A list of such tools follows:

Ounce Labs

Ounce Labs' code review tool (formerly Prexis) analyzes the source code of applications and identifies confirmed vulnerabilities and other potential security issues. Ounce has interfaces for users across the SDLC, from development/QA through C&A.

Parasoft's Jtest & C++test

Parasoft's Jtest is a Java testing product for development teams building Java EE, SOA, Web, and other Java applications. Parasoft's C++test provides coding policy enforcement, static analysis, code review, unit, and component testing for C and C++ code.

Klocwork Insight

Klocwork Insight finds software bugs and security vulnerabilities in C, C++ and Java code.

Fortify Source Code Analyzer (SCA)

Fortify SCA finds programming errors and vulnerabilities in 12 programming languages: Ajax (JavaScript), C/C++, Classic ASP, COBOL, ColdFusion, Java, .NET, PHP, PL/SQL, T/SQL and VB6. Fortify also finds errors in code that combines any of these 12 programming languages.

GrammarTech CodeSonar

GrammarTech CodeSonar is a source code analysis tool that performs interprocedural analysis on C/C++ code and identifies vulnerabilities in programming logic.

Coverity Prevent

Coverity Prevent identifies and resolves the critical security defects in C, C++ and Java source code.

5.4.1.2 Web Application Vulnerability Scanners

Web application scanners allow testers and application developers the ability to scan the web applications in a fully operational environment and check for many known security vulnerabilities. Web application scanners parse URLs from the target website to find vulnerabilities. These scanners check web applications for common security problems such as SQL injection, cross site scripting, command injection, buffer overflow, session management, and other vulnerabilities. These tools can be used to satisfy code review requirements based on the security checks provided by the tool. Web application scanners should be used on each web application release prior to deployment to a production environment.

WebInspect

WebInspect is a web vulnerability scanning tool that scans web applications for potential security flaws such as buffer overruns, weak cryptography, race conditions, SQL injection, cross site scripting, and others. WebInspect is automatically updated with known hacking techniques with each assessment performed.

AppScan

Watchfire's AppScan is a web application security testing tool that scans and tests for all common web application vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities scanned for include: SQL injection, cross site scripting, buffer overflow, and others.

Fortify Program Trace Analyzer (PTA)

Fortify PTA enables QA organizations to find security vulnerabilities and leaks while conducting functional testing enabling testers to uncover security vulnerabilities in the application with no additional effort. Fortify PTA also pinpoints vulnerabilities to specific lines of code, facilitating remediation.

5.4.2 Manual Code Review

A manual code review is performed by one or more application reviewers. Manual reviews are more time consuming than automated reviews and are reliant upon the skill and experience of the reviewer to find security flaws, but they have the advantage of being able to detect forms of vulnerability that might not be found through automated analysis.

5.4.3 Third Party Code Review

Several commercial companies offer code review services. These companies use a mixture of automated reviews and manual reviews by experienced auditors. Third-party review is valuable if the application is highly exposed, is large or cannot be manually reviewed in depth.

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6. DEPLOYMENT

This section covers general guidelines to be used when deploying an application. It may be used either alone or in addition to the guidance provided in the rest of this document. It consists of general guidelines and some specific requirements for operating in the DoD environment.

6.1 Documentation

6.1.1 System Security Plan (SSP)

The SSP will document all required IA roles and the specific personnel assigned to those roles. The SSP will document the assigned duties of the IA roles and the prerequisite training, security clearance, and any special requirements to perform the IA duties.

- *(APP2010.3: CAT II) The IAO will ensure all appointments to required IA roles are established in writing, to include assigned duties and appointment criteria such as training, security clearance and IT-designation.*

6.1.2 Classification Guide

The IAO will acquire the classification guide from the Program Manager and make it available to the application users.

- *(APP2040.2: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the classification guide for the application data exists and is available to users.*

6.1.3 Application Configuration Guide

The IAO will configure the application according to the Application Configuration Guide provided by the Program Manager of the developed application. General purpose servers share similar resources across numerous applications. A general purpose web server may host many websites on the same machine.

- *(APP6010: CAT II) The IAO will ensure if an application is designated critical the application is not hosted on a general purpose machine.*
- *(APP2020.6: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the application is deployed in a manner consistent with the Application Configuration Guide provided by the developers.*

6.1.4 Threat Model

The countermeasures identified throughout this process will be implemented by the IAO according to the threat model.

- *(APP3020.4: CAT II) The IAO will ensure identified mitigations to identified threats are implemented.*

6.2 Third Party Software

If a DoD STIG or NSA guide is not available, third party products used in the application will be configured to commercially accepted practices, independent testing results or vendor literature.

- *(APP6020: CAT II) The IAO shall ensure if a DoD STIG or NSA guide is not available a third party product will be configured by the following in descending order as available:(1) commercially accepted practices, (2) independent testing results, or (3) vendor literature.*

6.3 Ports and Protocols

While an application may be written to utilize any ports and/or protocols securely, the DoD has established guidelines regarding the use of certain ports and protocols crossing enclave boundaries. The application in a DoD environment will comply with the guidance provided in PPS Assurance Category Assignments List (CAL)

<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/396114>

- *(APP2100.3: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the application is configured to comply with the DoD Ports and Protocols guidance.*

The DISN Security Accreditation Working Group (DSAWG) may approve formal exceptions to the PPS guidance however the vulnerability still exists and should be recorded in the certification and accreditation documentation noting the vulnerability is present but the risk has been accepted.

- *(APP2110.3: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the application is registered with the DoD Ports and Protocols Database.*

6.4 Workplace Security Procedures

The IAO is responsible for developing procedures that assure sensitive, classified, FOUO, and other data classification not included, meet physical data handling and storage requirements for the production deployment site.

These procedures should include:

- end-of-day security checks
- unannounced security checks
- imposition of a two-person rule within the computing facility (where appropriate)
- *(APP2150.2: CAT II) The IAO will ensure procedures are implemented to assure physical handling and storage of information is in accordance with the data's sensitivity.*

6.5 Unnecessary Services

All unnecessary services installed by default in an application will be removed or disabled.

- *(APP6030: CAT II) The IAO will ensure unnecessary services are disabled or removed.*

6.6 Application Maintenance

6.6.1 Vulnerability Management

If the application developers have provided an automated alert mechanism to inform users of the availability of security updates, at least one application administrator must be registered to receive these notices.

If a security update is released for the application, the update will be applied after it has been operationally tested. If the update does impair the operation of the application, then the application hosting providers will give the developers feedback to correct any operational deficiencies in the application. The developers will issue a new release of the application to the hosting providers as soon as an update is available.

Many COTS products have included open source products in the packaging of their own products. One example is the Apache web server which is bundled with the Oracle DBMS product. The COTS product vendor will send updates when required for both open source tools provided in their product and their own custom developed software.

- *(APP6040: CAT II) The IAO will ensure at least one application administrator has registered to receive update notifications or security alerts when automated alerts are available.*
- *(APP6050: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the system and installed applications have current patches, security updates, and configuration settings.*

6.6.2 Maintenance Availability

As long as the application is in use, maintenance must be available to address any security flaws discovered in the application. New software vulnerability types are discovered on a regular basis, and it is always possible an application previously having no known exploits will have a vulnerability discovered.

The maintenance does not need to have an active team devoted to the application, but the facilities necessary to address the flaw in a timely and efficient manner must be available. If maintaining the application is no longer possible, users will be informed when maintenance will be discontinued so they may migrate to another solution. Software no longer under maintenance will be decommissioned and removed.

- *(APP6060: CAT III) The IAO will ensure the application is decommissioned when maintenance is no longer available.*
- *(APP6070: CAT III) The IAO will ensure provisions are in place to notify users when an application is decommissioned.*

6.7 Security Incident Response Process

The incident response process should be put in place to respond to reports of security flaws in the application. This process should include a method for individuals to submit potential security vulnerabilities to the development team. The process should then dictate what is to be done with the reported vulnerabilities. Reported vulnerabilities must be tracked throughout the process to ensure they are triaged, corrected, and tested. The corresponding update should be released to the user community. Also, the user community should be notified of the availability of the application update.

- *(APP2140.2: CAT II) The IAO will ensure a security incident response process for the application is followed.*

6.8 Denial of Service

A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an attempt to prevent legitimate users from accessing a resource. Attackers attempt to exhaust a particular resource pool of an application, thereby preventing it from functioning correctly. These resources include, but are not limited to: sessions, disk space, memory, process space, network connections, or bandwidth. DoS attacks may also target infrastructure components on which the application relies, such as routers or DNS servers.

DOS attacks include:

- Repeated attempts to login to a service or user account in order to lock the account disrupting the service or person
- Disrupting network traffic between server components creating unrecoverable timeout issues with the application
- Launching additional copies of the applications to consume memory, disk space, and/or fill the process tables
- Directly accessing individual application services to consume memory, disk space, and/or fill the process tables
- Generating excessive numbers of mail messages
- Generating errors that must be logged

These steps can be taken to help prevent or reduce the impact of DoS attacks. These include:

- Disable or remove unneeded services.
 - Enable disk quota systems if available.
 - Monitor the system to detect low resource situations.
- *(APP6080: CAT II) The IAO will ensure protections against denial of service attacks are implemented.*
 - *(APP6090: CAT III) The IAO will ensure the system alerts an administrator when low resource conditions are encountered.*

6.9 Access Control

The IAO will protect application configuration and executable files with the permission sets allowing only the application administrator to modify these files.

- *(APP3450.2: CAT II) The IAO will ensure application resources are protected with permission sets only allowing application administrator to modify these configurations and files.*
- *(APP3450.3: CAT II) The IAO will ensure access to format strings used by the application are restricted to authorized users.*

6.10 Database Exports

Production database exports are often used to refresh development databases. The production database exports will need to be scrubbed to prevent the administrative database user passwords for production from becoming available to development database staff. Certain data in database exports should not be revealed to the database staff because of classification, privacy, and other sensitive types of information.

- *(APP6100: CAT II) The IAO will ensure production database exports have database administration credentials and sensitive data removed before releasing the export.*

6.11 PKI Certificate Configuration

In a production environment the application should be configured to accept only valid DoD PKI certificates. Invalid, expired, revoked, and test certificates should not be issued in a production environment.

- *(APP3290.2: CAT I) The IAO will ensure the PK-enabled applications are configured to honor only valid DoD PKI certificates.*

6.12 Auditing

6.12.1 Audit Trail Monitoring

Audit trail records from all available sources are regularly reviewed for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity.

- *(APP6110: CAT III) The IAO will review audit trails periodically based on system documentation recommendations or immediately upon system security events.*

Suspected violations of IA policies are analyzed and reported in accordance with DoD information system IA procedures.

- *(APP6120: CAT II) The IAO will report all suspected violations of IA policies in accordance with DoD information system IA procedures.*

For classified systems, automated monitoring of audit trails is required.

- *(APP6130: CAT III) The IAO will ensure application audit trails are continuously and automatically monitored and alerts are provided immediately when unusual or inappropriate activity is detected.*

6.12.2 Audit Log Retention

Audit logs should be retained for a minimum of one year for applications not containing SAMI data. If the application contains SAMI data, the audit logs need to be retained for no less than five years.

- *(APP6140: CAT II) The IAO will ensure application audit trails are retained for at least one year for applications without SAMI data, and five years for applications including SAMI data.*

6.12.3 Audit Trail Protection

The contents of audit trails are protected against unauthorized access, modification, or deletion.

- *(APP3690.3: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the audit trail is readable only by application administrators and auditors.*
- *(APP3690.4: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the audit trail is protected against modification or deletion except by application administrators and auditors.*

6.13 Recovery and Contingency Planning

Recovery and contingency planning is an important aspect of the deployment phase of the application. Documented backup and recovery procedures are required in the event of a system failure. Any circumstances prohibiting system recovery should be documented and included as a part of the recovery procedures. System recovery needs to be performed in a secure and verifiable manner to protect the application and data.

- *(APP6160.1: CAT II) The IAO will ensure recovery procedures and technical system features exist so recovery is performed in a secure and verifiable manner.*
- *(APP6160.2: CAT II) The IAO will document circumstances inhibiting a trusted recovery.*

Back-up copies of the application software are stored in a fire-rated container or otherwise not collocated with the operational software.

- *(APP6170: CAT II) The IAO will ensure back-up copies of the applications software are stored in a fire rated container and not collocated with operational software.*
- *(APP6180: CAT II) The IAO will ensure procedures are in place to assure the appropriate physical and technical protection of the backup and restoration of the application.*

Backup and recovery procedures vary based on the application MAC level.

For MAC 3 systems:

- *(APP6190.1: CAT II) The IAO will ensure data backup is performed at least weekly.*

For MAC 2 Systems:

- *(APP6190.2: CAT II) The IAO will ensure data backup is performed daily and recovery media are stored off-site at a location.*

For MAC 1 Systems:

- *(APP6190.3: CAT II) The IAO will ensure data backup is accomplished by maintaining a redundant secondary system, not collocated, that can be activated without loss of data or disruption to the operation.*

Disaster recovery plans include business recovery plans, system contingency plans, facility disaster recovery plans and plan acceptance. Disaster recovery procedures for all systems vary based on their MAC level.

For MAC I systems:

- *(APP6200.1: CAT II) The IAO shall ensure a disaster plan exists providing for the smooth transfer of all mission or business essential functions to an alternate site for the duration of an event with little or no loss of operational continuity.*

For MAC II Systems:

- *(APP6200.2: CAT II) The IAO shall ensure a disaster plan exists providing for the resumption of mission or business essential functions within 24 hours activation.*

For MAC III Systems:

- *(APP6200.3: CAT II) The IAO shall ensure a disaster plan exists providing for the partial resumption of mission or business essential functions within 5 days of activation.*

6.14 Account Management

The IAO is responsible for the overall account management of a production application.

Individual user accounts must be suspended, disabled, or removed from the application when they are terminated or no longer are required to have access to the application.

- *(APP6210: CAT II) The IAO will ensure an account management process is implemented verifying only authorized users can gain access to the application and individual accounts designated as inactive, suspended, or terminated are promptly removed.*

Password policies must comply with organizational password policies and not generate predictable passwords.

- *(APP6220: CAT II) The IAO will ensure passwords generated for users are not predictable and comply with the organizations password policy.*

Individual users must be granted their own user accounts and not be allowed to share individual application user accounts.

- *(APP6230: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the applications users do not use shared accounts.*

All users who are authorized to have access to the application but have not authenticated within the past 90 days, will have their accounts disabled.

- *(APP6240: CAT III) The IAO will ensure inactive but authorized user application accounts are disabled.*
- *(APP6250: CAT II) The IAO will ensure unnecessary built-in application accounts are disabled.*
- *(APP6260: CAT I) The IAO will ensure default passwords are changed.*
- *(APP3320.8 CAT II) The IAO will configure the application to ensure account passwords conform to DoD password policy.*
- *(APP3470.2: CAT II) The IAO will ensure access to privileged accounts is limited to privileged users.*
- *(APP3470.3: CAT II) The IAO will ensure non-privileged accounts are limited to non-privileged users.*
- *(APP3470.4: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the application account is established and administered in accordance with a role-based access scheme to enforce least privilege and separation of duties.*
- *(APP3480.3: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the access procedures enforce the principles of separation of duties and "least privilege".*

6.15 Deployment Infrastructure

If application spans between DoD enclaves and the Internet or other public or commercial wide area, a DMZ is required. Refer to the Enclave STIG for specific DMZ requirements.

<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/397960>

- *(APP6270: CAT II) The IAO will ensure connections between DoD enclaves and the Internet or other public or commercial wide area networks require a DMZ.*

- *(APP2160.3: CAT II) The IAO will ensure deployment systems and all components comply with all appropriate DoD STIGS, NSA guides and all applicable DoD policies.*

APPENDIX A. REFERENCES

Government References

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NIST Configuration Management in Security related Software Engineering Processes
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National Vulnerability Database <http://nvd.nist.gov/>

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<http://blogs.msdn.com/larryosterman/archive/2005/01/17/354588.aspx>

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The Security Development Lifecycle Blog <http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/rss.xml>

Michael Howard's Microsoft Software Security Blog http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/

Microsoft STRIDE methodology Threat modeling Tool

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=62830f95-0e61-4f87-88a6-e7c663444ac1&displaylang=en>

Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Banned Function Calls <http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb288454.aspx>

SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute Training <http://www.sans.org/training/>

APPENDIX B. UNSAFE FUNCTIONS

Appendix B identifies functions that have a greater potential to cause application vulnerabilities. The presence of these functions does not immediately indicate a vulnerability; however, if they are used inappropriately a vulnerability may exist.

C and C++ Functions to Avoid		
Function	Reason	Potential Replacements
strcpy	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
wscpy	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
_tscopy	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
_mbscopy	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
StrCpy	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
StrCpyA	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
StrCpyW	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
lstrcpy	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
lstrcpyA	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
lstrcpyW	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
strcpyA	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
strcpyW	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
_tcpy	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
_mbcpy	Potential for buffer overflows	strcpy_s, StringCchCopy, StringCbCopy, strncpy
strcat	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strcat
wscat	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strcat
_tscat	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strcat
_mbscat	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strcat
strCat	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strcat

strCatA	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
strCatW	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
lstrcat	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
lstrcatA	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
lstrcatW	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
strCatBuffW	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
strCatBuff	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
strCatBuffA	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
strCatChainW	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
strcatA	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
strcatW	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
_tccat	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
_mbccat	Potential for buffer overflows	strcat_s, StringCchCat, StringCbCat, strlcat
sprintf	Potential format string vulnerabilities	
wsprintf	Potential format string vulnerabilities	
fprintf	Potential format string vulnerabilities	

Table B-1. C Unsafe Functions

APPENDIX C. GLOSSARY

Application. Software program that performs a specific function directly for a user and can be executed without access to system control, monitoring, or administrative privileges. Examples include office automation, electronic mail, web services, and major functional or mission software programs.

Automated Information System (AIS) Application. For DoD information assurance purposes, an AIS application is the product or deliverable of an acquisition program, such as those described in DoD Directive 5000.1. An AIS application performs clearly defined functions for which there are readily identifiable security considerations and needs that are addressed as part of the acquisition. An AIS application may be a single software application (e.g., Integrated Consumable Items Support (ICIS)); multiple software applications that are related to a single mission (e.g., payroll or personnel); or a combination of software and hardware performing a specific support function across a range of missions (e.g., Global Command and Control System (GCCS), Defense Messaging System (DMS)). AIS applications are deployed to enclaves for operations, and have their operational security needs assumed by the enclave. Note: An AIS application is analogous to a "major application," as defined in OMB A-130; however, this term is not used in order to avoid confusion with the DoD acquisition category of Major Automated Information System (MAIS).

Certificate. A digital representation of information that, at a minimum, identifies the certification authority issuing it, names or identifies its subscriber, contains the subscriber's public key, identifies its operational period, and is digitally signed by the certification authority issuing it.

Common Access Card (CAC). A Department-wide smart card used as the identification card for active duty Uniformed Services personnel (to include the Selected Reserve), DoD civilian employees, eligible contractor personnel, and eligible foreign nationals; the primary platform for the public key infrastructure authentication token used to access DoD computer networks and systems in the unclassified environment and, where authorized by governing security directives, the classified environment; and the principal card enabling physical access to buildings, facilities, installations, and controlled spaces.

DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). Perimeter network that adds an extra layer of protection between internal and external networks by enforcing the internal network's IA policy for external information exchange. A DMZ, also called a "screened subnet," provides external, untrusted sources with restricted access to releasable information while shielding the internal networks from outside attacks.

DoD-Approved External PKI. A PKI approved by the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO for use by DoD relying parties for assurance levels appropriate for the information being protected.

DoD Eligible Users. DoD eligible users are active duty Uniformed Services personnel, members of the Selected Reserve, DoD civilian employees, and personnel working on site at DoD facilities using DoD network and e-mail services.

DoD Information System. Set of information resources organized for the collection, storage, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, disposition, display, or transmission of information. Includes AIS applications, enclaves, outsourced IT-based processes, and platform IT interconnections.

DoD Partners. DoD partners are Government or non-Government entities that process electronic transactions with the Department of Defense, or exchange e-mail containing DoD sensitive information.

DoD Private Web Server. For unclassified networks, a DoD private web server is any DoD-owned, operated, or controlled web server providing access to sensitive information that has not been reviewed and approved for release in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.9 and DoD Instruction 5230.29. For Secret Internet Protocol Router Network and other classified networks that are not accessible to the public, a DoD private web server is any server that provides access to information that requires need-to-know control or compartmentation.

Enclave. Collection of computing environments connected by one or more internal networks under the control of a single authority and security policy, including personnel and physical security. Enclaves always assume the highest mission assurance category and security classification of the AIS applications or outsourced IT-based processes they support, and derive their security needs from those systems. They provide standard IA capabilities, such as boundary defense, incident detection and response, and key management, and also deliver common applications, such as office automation and electronic mail. Enclaves are analogous to general support systems as defined in OMB A-130. Enclaves may be specific to an organization or a mission, and the computing environments may be organized by physical proximity or by function independent of location. Examples of enclaves include local area networks and the applications they host, backbone networks, and data processing centers.

Enclave Boundary. The point at which an enclave's internal network service layer connects to an external network's service layer.

Hardware Token. A portable, user-controlled, physical device used to generate, store, and protect cryptographic information, and to perform cryptographic functions.

IA Manager (IAM). The individual responsible for the information assurance program of a DoD information system or organization. While the term IAM is favored within the Department of Defense, it may be used interchangeably with the IA title Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM).

IA Officer (IAO). An individual responsible to the IAM for ensuring that the appropriate operational IA posture is maintained for a DoD information system or organization. While the term IAO is favored within the Department of Defense, it may be used interchangeably with other IA titles (e.g., Information Systems Security Officer, Information Systems Security Custodian, Network Security Officer, or Terminal Area Security Officer).

IA Product. Product or technology whose primary purpose is to provide security services (e.g., confidentiality, authentication, integrity, access control or non-repudiation of data); correct known vulnerabilities; and/or provide layered defense against various categories of non-authorized or malicious penetrations of information systems or networks. Examples include such products as data/network encryptors, firewalls, and intrusion detection devices.

IA-Enabled Product. Product or technology whose primary role is not security, but which provides security services as an associated feature of its intended operating capabilities. Examples include such products as security-enabled web browsers, screening routers, trusted operating systems, and security-enabled messaging systems.

Information Owner. Official with statutory or operational authority for specified information and responsibility for establishing the controls for its generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and disposal.

Information-Privileged Individual. For purposes of this Instruction, an information-privileged individual is a person whom the Department of Defense has authorized access to specified DoD information systems to provide them information about, or access to, benefits, entitlements or services, which may be available to them. The information may include information protected by the Privacy Act or Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which may be lawfully displayed to them. Information-privileged individuals include retirees and dependents. These individuals are provided access to these systems to facilitate the delivery of benefits, entitlements and services. Information-privileged individuals will not be provided access to other DoD sensitive systems, unless they are otherwise authorized such access.

Mobile Code. Software modules obtained from remote systems, transferred across a network, and then downloaded and executed on local systems without explicit installation or execution by the recipient.

National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP). Joint initiative between NSA and NIST responsible for security testing needs of both IT consumers and producers and promoting the development of technically sound security requirements for IT products and systems and appropriate measures for evaluating those products and systems.

Need-to-Know. Necessity for access to, or knowledge or possession of, specific official DoD information required to carry out official duties.

Need-to-Know Determination. Decision made by an authorized holder of official information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific official information to carry out official duties.

Public Key Infrastructure. The framework and services that provide for the generation, production, distribution, control, accounting and destruction of public key certificates.

Sensitive Information. Information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of, could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of Federal programs, or the privacy

to which individuals are entitled under Section 552a of title 5, United States Code, "The Privacy Act", but which has not been specifically authorized under criteria established by Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. (Section 278g-3 of title 15, United States Code, "The Computer Security Act of 1987"). Examples of sensitive information include, but are not limited to information in DoD payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management systems.

Sensitive information sub-categories include, but are not limited to, the following:

For Official Use Only (FOUO). In accordance with DoD 5400.7-R, DoD information exempted from mandatory public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Privacy Data. Any record that is contained in a system of records as defined in the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) and information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (DoD UCNI). Unclassified Information on security measures (including security plans, procedures, and equipment) for the physical protection of DoD Special Nuclear Material (SNM), equipment, or facilities in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.83. Information is Designated DoD UCNI only when it is determined that its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by increasing significantly the likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear weapons or the theft, diversion, or sabotage of DoD SNM, equipment, or facilities.

Unclassified Technical Data. Data that is not classified but is subject to export control and is withheld from public disclosure according to DoD Directive 5230.25.

Proprietary Information. Information that is provided by a source or sources under the condition that it not be released to other sources.

Foreign Government Information. Information that originated from a foreign government and that is not classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher, but must be protected in accordance with DoD 5200.1-R.

Department of State Sensitive But Unclassified (DoS SBU). Information that originated from the Department of State (DoS) that has been determined to be SBU under appropriate DoS information security policies.

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Sensitive Information. Information that is originated by the Drug Enforcement Administration and requires protection against unauthorized disclosure to protect sources and methods of investigative activity, evidence, and the integrity of pretrial investigative reports.

Sources and Methods Intelligence (SAMI). Any classified non-SCI information that has been determined by the Data or Information Owner to need the protection afforded by DCID 6/5 and bears a SAMI marking.

Web Server. An automated information system that manages a web site by passing web pages to web browsers over a network. The web server may provide information stored locally on the server or may act as a portal to access information from other linked information systems.